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The following research analyses the impact of the War on Drugs in Mexico. Albeit acknowledging 
the importance of the United States in the counter-narcotic efforts, the research is focused on the 
actors that experienced the conflict in the first place: the Mexican state, the cartels and the Mexican 
population. The research exits the realist perspective and discusses the case study from a 
constructivist point of view, with a focus on the securitisation of the narcotic aspect. The research 
concludes that, despite a decade long conflict, organised crime is still present. The War on Drugs 
strategy did not manage to respect the initial promise of dismantling drug cartels and instead 
pushed them towards a structural and territorial fragmentation as well as hyper-militarisation. 
Moreover, the rigid approach led to a diversification of illicit activities which are currently a direct 
threat for human security. The final results show that organised crime has high probabilities of 
surviving due to several key-factors: economic resources, violent means, corruptible legal actors, a 
constant demand of illicit goods and ungoverned spaces.  




















The Latin American continent is seldom considered from a security point of view. After 
decades of authoritarian regimes, the region has experienced a new wave of democratisation and a 
rapid economic development which transformed the area into one of the most peaceful in the world. 
Officially, the continent has no on-going interstate or intrastate armed conflicts. However, several 
scholars question the official utopian discourse and consider that despite being relatively tranquil, 
Latin America is currently experiencing a combination of old security problems and new regional 
menaces, organised crime and drug-trafficking in primis (Hernández-Roy, 2007:32). Albeit the 
seriousness of organised crime’s activities, until recently, criminal groups were analysed by 
criminologists rather than political scientists (Allum and Gilmour, 2012). This approach was due to 
the fact that political scientists were more focused on analysing full developed democracies rather 
than the so-called Third World countries (and for a long period of time, criminal activities were 
considered a product of the political instability common in the abovementioned nations). 
Fortunately, perceptions have changed and the growing interest is linked to the fact that organised 
crime has the extraordinary capacity to adapt to any type of political environment (Allum and 
Gilmour, 2012). Every country in the world experienced, to a certain extent, criminal activities 
perpetrated by organised crime. Moreover, organised crime has the ability to rapidly adapt during 
periods of crisis, despite the attempts of diminishing its influence. One of the most famous militants 
against organised crime, the Italian judge Giovanni Falcone, explains this chameleonic capacity by 
declaring that criminal groups “live in perfect symbiosis with a myriad of protectors, 
accomplices…informers, and people from all strata of society” (cited in Allum and Gilmour, 2012). 
Malone and Malone-Rowe argue, more specifically, that criminal groups strengthen their 
operational power particularly during a democratisation process which “fundamentally changes the 
politics, economies, and societies of most countries” (2014:475). Falcone, being a judge, considered 
that organised crime’s activities should be fought at an institutional level by strengthening the 
state’s legal and judicial capacities, rather than adopting austere methods. One important rigid 
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approach against illicit activities, more specifically drug-trafficking, is the War on Drugs (WOD) 
policy. Vellinga offers a concise and clear explanation for the abovementioned technique by stating 
that “the War on Drugs strategy has been focusing primarily on the interdiction of drug production 
and trade” (2000:118).  
The United States (U.S.) is one of the major actors in using the “strong hand” policy in 
tackling the drug problem and through the decades managed to involve in this process also other 
nations (voluntarily or not). Albeit being called a WOD, officially, this policy, is far from being 
considered an armed conflict. More specifically, it is considered a low-intensity conflict which 
justifies the deployment of military personnel in a non-war zone (Dunn, 1997). It should be 
mentioned that narco-groups are not a separated reality typical of the suburbs or of the poor rural 
areas, instead they are well rooted in all societal levels and a WOD designed exclusively for the 
criminal groups will most definitely affect the entirety of the society they are operating in. The 
Latin American region has experienced several WOD which had the same outcome: the relocation 
of the drug production to a neighbouring country which creates a vicious circle of death and 
violence. Therefore, from a regional security point of view, organised crime is a serious threat. In 
fact, the criminal groups, which are in search of increasing their profits, are a direct threat “to 
democratic states struggling to establish and uphold the rule of law” (Malone and Malone-Rowe, 
2014:471) and weak institutions are a promising soil for political corruption and illicit activities. 
The following research intends to focus on a specific case study, Mexico, in order to provide 
an in-depth analysis of the situation covering the 2006-2016 timeframe. The originality of the 
analysis is the fact that the author aims at taking the distance from the traditional approach which 
focuses its attention primarily on the role of the U.S. in the WOD policy. The Mexican WOD will 
be discussed by analysing its interaction with the actors that experienced it directly: the Mexican 
state, the cartels and the Mexican populace. Ultimately, the research aims to determine if the violent 
counter-narcotic strategy failed its original goal of weakening criminal groups and has instead 
empowered them. The research intends to analyse the impact of the WOD in Mexico through a 
qualitative approach. The entirety of the Mexican society was affected by the WOD, therefore the 
violent approach will be analysed in relation with violence, territory, political corruption and 
population. Chapter 2 will present the role that the U.S. had in creating counter-narcotics policies 
with regards towards a very specific region, Latin America. Moreover, it will be analysed the 
development of the concept of “threat” in the region, with a passage from Communism to narcotics, 
by presenting the Colombian and the Mexican cases. Chapter 3 will guide the reader through the 
literature review which presents the interaction of three particular subjects in the WOD: the state, 
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the criminal groups and the populace. Chapter 4 will help the reader to understand how a practical 
and active strategy as the WOD can be integrated within a theoretical framework. The main theories 
that will be the fil rouge of the research are constructivism and securitisation which will have the 
final aim of explaining how such a violent strategy was rapidly implemented from a political point 
of view and immediately accepted by the majority of the population. Chapter 5 will present the 
methods that the researcher followed in order to fully analyse the Mexican case study. Chapter 6 
and 7 will present the final results of the research. The research intends to reduce the limited 
existing literature regarding the security threat posed by narco-groups. The main problem is that 
cartels are solely related to murderous violence and obtain international interests only when an 
atrocious event verifies. However, the following research intends to demonstrate that the imposing 
presence of cartels is a structural problem and their capabilities are perilous. Decades of political 
corruption and lack of democratic stability created the perfect environment for criminal groups and 
the lack of critical literature is the astounding example of the minimisation of cartels’ perceived 




































Defining and isolating illegal substances is a complex issue. For decades heroin and cocaine 
have been used as legal medical material and there is no mystery that many Andean countries (such 
as Peru) consider the use of coca leaves a part of their secular culture (Roth, 2014:11). Narcotic 
illicit business and the attempts to stop it have an intricate history. The drug trade has a strong 
impact on societies and often, the countries affected by it, pursue counter-narcotic efforts both by 
pacific and violent means. The WOD approach is not certainly a new method in order to break the 
drug chain. The British Empire and China have experienced two Opium Wars (in mid-XIX century) 
and the rationale behind them was that China decided to start a WOD in order to annihilate the 
control the East India Company had over the Chinese population which was subject to the massive 
importation of opiates perpetrated by the Company (Roth, 2014:12). However, already in the first 
exhaustively documented WOD, the drugs were not precisely the main actor. The central interest 
was to diminish the sovereign requests China had over its own territory. The first 
internationalisation of the “strong hand” rhetoric took place in 1909, during the Shanghai Opium 
Commission, which was specifically requested by a prohibitionist U.S. The 1909 conference was 
followed by another one in 1911 which put in place the first drug control treaty called the 
International Opium Convention (Jenner, 2014:66). In less than two decades drugs such as cocaine, 
hashish, heroin and cannabis were declared dangerous which opened wide the way for a massive 
illicit business that never stopped because “prohibition causes the formation of an underground 
black market” (Jenner, 2014:67). However, there is a certain degree of assertion between scholars 
which admit that the narcotic menace was, at least partially, constructed. What is argued, more 
specifically, is that certain drugs and their production realities are given a nefarious connotation in 




It is certainly clear that the U.S., which is considered a pioneer of the counter-narcotic effort, 
had its own historical role in the Latin American region which will be further discussed. In fact, as 
Jenner argues, “the U.S. is the unofficial leader of the fight against drugs” as it is the country that 
spends the most on counter-narcotics operations, both home and abroad, and the annual expenditure 
is around 50 billion dollars (2014:75). The chapter will guide the reader through the history of the 
War(s) on Drugs in Latin America by focusing on the constructed concept of “threat”, on the 
Certification Process and on two major operations (Plan Colombia and Plan Mexico). The 
following section intends to briefly present the rise of the drug trade in Latin America and the 
subsequent counter-narcotic efforts, which were possible due to the subtle participation of the 
hegemonic Northern state. The research per se is focused on the specific Mexican case, but it is 
paramount, for a better understanding of current events, to address the historical role the U.S had in 
the counter-narcotic efforts.  
2.1 The threat 
The territorial vicinity between Latin America and the United states has always been a 
source of attrition between the two realities. One the one hand, the U.S. defined Latin America as 
its own backyard who had to be protected; on the other hand Latin America was never fond of U.S.’ 
hegemonic interventions in the region (Fernandez, 2017). Porfirio Diaz’s quote “so far from God, 
so near to the United states” (cited in Mares, 2016:302) explains perfectly the historical resentment 
that Latin America has regarding its proximity to the U.S. It is acknowledged that the U.S. is an 
important actor in the region and it always had a dominant relationship with the continent per se 
(Hurrell, 1998:531). Due to its strong influence the U.S. had, in the aftermath of WWII, the power 
to define “what comprised an existential threat to the hemisphere” (Bagley, 2007:52). The concept 
of security during the Cold War was primarily related with the U.S. - Soviet Union relations and the 
antagonist relationship directly affected Latin America (Mares, 2016:302; Tickner, 2016:69).  
 
Historically Latin America was defined as a producer of cocaine due to its territorial and 
meteorological peculiarities. In fact, the coca bushes can be cultivated only in the South American 
region due to the specificity of its climate and de facto, the totality of cocaine consumed in the 
world has origins in solely three countries: Colombia, Peru and Bolivia (Jenner, 2014:68). Already 
in the late 1940s Peru was the main provider of cocaine and the U.S. was its largest consumer 
(Roth, 2014:14). However, until the early 1970s “the South American cocaine trade remained 
small” (Roth, 2014:14) which implies that the problem, despite existing, was not considered a 
menace. In fact, during the most intense years of the Cold War, the drug problem was considered a 
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secondary issue when compared with the more imposing Communist ideology which was seen as a 
direct threat to U.S.’s national security. The Communist ideology was considered “the region’s 
largest security threat”, and thus reinforced the need to have control over the area (Tickner, 
2016:67). Bagley argues that the U.S. was extremely concerned regarding the Soviet threat and 
unilaterally established that it had “the right to intervene within the domestic affairs of any Latin 
American state that faced communist political aggression” (2007:58). A major instrument, in order 
to eliminate the problem, was the creation of the School of the Americas (SOA) which trained more 
than 60,000 Latin American military personnel in “counterinsurgency theory and tactics” (Tickner, 
2016:69). The outcome of this decision was the formation of long and cruel authoritarian regimes 
led by militaries trained in the SOA. The regimes that terrorised the Latin American population for 
decades were supported by the U.S (either openly or indirectly). The U.S.’s political establishment 
considered that an authoritarian right-wing regime was preferable to a liberal state which might 
have had higher probabilities of being subject to the Communist influence (Bagley, 2007:58). As a 
matter of fact, during the Cold War period, many Latin American national security doctrines were 
embedded with the anti-communist discourse supported by the U.S. (Nolte and Wehner, 2016:35). 
The national documents were focused on the traditional realist concept of security and aimed at 
exclusively protecting the state and its boundaries, perfectly reflecting that specific historical period 
(Kacowicz and Mares, 2016:19; Nolte and Wehner, 2016:34).  
 
The drug trade, albeit existing, was hence not considered a vital threat and solely in 1989 the 
U.S. “replaced its war on communism with the war on drugs” in Latin America (Malone and 
Malone-Rowe, 2014:473). Indeed, only in the post-Cold War era, the U.S. (through its Department 
of Defence) broadened the list of vital threats to its national security including new elements such as 
drug-trafficking and organised crime activities (Bagley, 2007:60; Kacowicz, 2007:102). More 
specifically, Bagley argues that drug-trafficking became officially a threat in 1991 (2007:62). The 
recurrent security dilemma is not related anymore solely to the realist view of the asymmetrical 
power of the states within the region, but also to “states with weak institutional and governance 
capabilities, and notably ineffective judicial systems and public security” (Marcella, 2016:167) 
which are a fertile ground for the development of illicit activities. Indeed, Hurrell considers that, 
after the end of the bipolarity typical of the Cold War, Latin America experienced a widening in 
different types of security menaces (1998:530) which are disquieting for the northern neighbour. 
Despite the fact that the rigorous Northern American control softened “due to the combination of 
global challenges to U.S. leadership and a diversification of Latin America’s international 
8 
 
relations”, the U.S. is still an important figure regarding the counter-narcotic efforts in the region 
(Mares, 2016:302).  
 
2.2 The War(s) on Drugs: Colombia, Mexico and the Certification Process 
The modern WOD was officially declared by the American President, Richard Nixon in 
1971 and the counter-narcotics policy was consequently enforced by the next U.S. presidents 
(Jenner, 2014:67). Without a doubt, the U.S.’ peculiarities, such as vicinity to major drug producers 
and a high level of narcotics demand transformed it in an “ideological centre of the global War on 
Drugs” (Martin and McCulloch, 2014:108). Historically, states have been invited to join the anti-
drugs fight and the adhesion happened both willingly and coercively. A convincing instrument used 
by the U.S., in order to have leverage on other countries, is the Certification Process. The system, 
implemented for the first time in 1986, consists in categorising nations, subject to the drug chain, in: 
producer, consumer or transit (Storrs, 2003). Critically, Bouley argues that the process is used in 
order “to ensure that Latin American countries conform to U.S. views on the war on drugs” 
(2001:178). The main objective of the Certification Process is to identify those countries that, from 
a narcotic point of view, represent a threat to the U.S. The countries that are on the threat-list are 
subject to sanctions which go from public defamation to a total blockade of economic aid 
(excluding humanitarian aid). However, the countries could avoid sanctions if the U.S.’s President 
“certifies that the country has fully cooperated in counter-narcotics efforts” (Bouley, 2001:178). 
Considering the economic impact of a possible accusation regarding the unwillingness of combating 
drug-trafficking, several countries have accepted to cooperate with the U.S. in its WOD. Despite the 
counter-narcotics cooperation between the two actors, the Certification Process is “a major source 
of tension between the U.S. and Latin America” (Bouley, 2001:178). In short, for many Latin 
American countries the Certification Process might be perceived as an extreme form of punishment 
which intensifies the U.S.’s hegemonic presence in the region.  
 The WOD policy and the violent approach of killing the kingpins are certainly not new. 
Colombia is probably the first example that comes to mind when considering the drug problem in 
Latin America as for decades, since the late 1970s, it was considered “the murder capital of the 
world” (Malone and Malone-Rowe, 2014:473). Undoubtedly, Colombia has experienced decades of 
drug related violence. In the early 1970s the violent criminal groups known as cartels have joined 
their forces with the Marxist group FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) which 
offered in exchange their protection (Jenner, 2014:67). The strange cooperation, between common 
criminals (at least at the time) craving for profit and a leftist political-driven insurgent group, was 
9 
 
considered dangerous as FARC was defined the “greatest threat” to U.S.’s hegemony in the region 
(second only to Cuba) (Hylton, 2010:102). The cooperation between cartels and FARC started to 
challenge the sovereignty of the Colombian state by creating the so-called “competitive nation 
building” (Malone and Malone-Rowe, 2014:474) where figures such as Pablo Escobar offered 
protection and social welfare in order to gain the sympathy of the lower classes. It went down in 
history the arrogant proposal that Pablo Escobar made to the Colombian state which consisted of 
paying the national debt (Malone and Malone-Rowe, 2014:474). Such proposal perfectly depicted 
the weakness of the Latin American state compared to the growing power and wealth of the narco-
cartels. The Colombian and U.S.’ relations in the 1970s have been defined by Franz as “narcotised” 
which implied the use of economic aid as leverage in order to obtain in exchange more aggressive 
counter-narcotics policies (2016:571).  
 The modern hyper-militarised WOD was adopted in Colombia in the 1980s with the main 
goal of finding and killing the heads of the two major Colombian drug cartels, Medellín and Cali. 
The Colombian state (economically supported by the U.S.) started a ferocious fight against both the 
FARC and the cartels. However, the dismantling of the two main cartels, the killing of its leaders 
and the destruction of the Caribbean drug route did not have a strong impact on the massive 
narcotics industry (Crandall, cited in Flannery, 2013:190). In lieu, the adopted approach “has 
opened an inter-cartel power vacuum” (Carpenter, 2010:401) which was at the basis of a crescent 
level of violence. On one hand, the remaining members of the criminal groups created smaller 
unities which were harder to defeat, and on the other hand, the drug trade migrated towards the 
natural successor, Mexico, (considering its geographical position) which experienced the passage 
from a transit country to a main producer and supplier of drugs (Malone and Malone-Rowe, 
2014:475). It seems that “a dead king is a replaced king” (Sanchez-Moreno, 2015:37) and Mexican 
cartels supplanted the Colombian ones. 
 In 1998 Columbia continued being the indisputable leader of cocaine production, albeit the 
aggressiveness displayed by the Colombian state, towards cartels, since the 1980s (Jenner, 
2014:78). In order to contain the problem, the U.S. and Colombia started another bi-lateral 
cooperation called “Plan Colombia” which lasted for two decades, until 2008 (Mejia, 2016:3). The 
main objectives of the programme were to diminish drug production and to help the Colombian 
government gain sovereignty over its territory by weakening the paramilitary group FARC (Jenner, 
2014:78). From an operational point of view, the main approaches were eradication, ignition, aerial 
herbicides spraying and interdiction (Mejia, 2016). Despite having achieved some limited 
successes, overall cocaine production had the so-called “cockroach effect” which displaced the 
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production from cities to more remote areas in the Colombian jungle (Jenner, 2014:78). At the end 
of Plan Colombia, the country was still producing 51% of the global quantity of cocaine (Jenner, 
2014:78). If considered domestically, it can be argued that Plan Colombia had some positive 
outcomes. In fact, during the 2000-2008 timeframe, “1,842 metric tons of cocaine have been 
seized…and more than 27,000 cocaine processing laboratories have been destroyed” which 
represents 27% of the total quantity of cocaine presumably produced during the same period of time 
(Mejia, 2016:10). On the other hand, scholars such as Hylton, are extremely sceptic about the 
success of operations such as Plan Colombia. Hylton argues that “besides the police, the secret 
police, the armed forces, the executive, and local-regional governments run by narco- paramilitary 
mafias, it would be difficult to point to other Colombian institutions that have been strengthened” 
(2010:99). More drastically, Hylton affirms that an inheritance of Plan Colombia is the 
development of corrupt “narco-paramilitary mafias which challenge the state’s sovereignty” 
(2010:108). It might be perceived that Plan Colombia has benefited solely the economic elites, 
disregarding the region. In fact, Colombia is not an entity disconnected from the rest of the region 
and the limited successes within its national borders influenced negatively the Latin American 
hemisphere (Jenner, 2014:78). Some unorthodox scholars consider that the counter-narcotics 
approaches in Colombia aimed exclusively at the elimination of leftist insurgencies and stopping 
the production of cocaine was solely a justification in order to have the approval of the public 
opinion (Petras, 2001:32). It is indeed argued that the unofficial message of Plan Colombia was to 
maintain a certain control over strategic territories by eliminating the leftist rebels (Delgado-Ramos 
and Romano, 2011:95). 
 The Colombian experience offered a macabre preview of what was going to happen in 
Mexico solely three decades later. In fact, in his research, Bagley recognises that “Mexico’s current 
drug-related bloodbath” is a consequence of the Colombian counter-narcotic operations (2013:104). 
Indeed, in the grey zones created in Colombia after the massive anti-drug violent campaigns, small 
Mexican criminal groups inserted themselves and became the current multinational powerful 
organisations. In fact, Sanchez-Moreno confirms this by arguing that when the international 
community was not focused anymore on the Colombian case, small criminal groups have replaced 
the historical Medellín and Cali cartels amplifying the level of insecurity and violence (2015:37).  
 The U.S. has always had a special relationship with Mexico, both for geographical and 
historical reasons. The first attempts of smuggling goods over the border were performed by 
Mexican criminal groups during the U.S.’s Prohibition period (Medel and Thoumi, 2014:1). 
Initially, the smuggling was focused mainly on alcoholic beverages, but once the restrictions were 
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elevated the newly constructed black market was able to transport and provide any prohibited goods 
(Foster, 2013). It could be argued that almost a century ago Mexico experienced its first 
diversification in illicit business by shifting the focus from alcohol to other illicit substances, such 
as marijuana and opium (Foster, 2013). Even then the northern frontier was of paramount 
importance as the smuggling check points were in small border towns, such as Tijuana and Ciudad 
Juárez, which facilitated the smuggling of the new drugs to the U.S. (Medel and Thoumi, 2014:1). 
The first Mexican states specialised in drug production and trafficking were Sinaloa, Durango, 
Chihuahua, and Baja California and to this day are main producers of marijuana (Medel and 
Thoumi, 2014:1). The legislative acts promoted by the U.S. which limited the import and use of 
opium and coca leaves such as the Opium Exclusion Act (1909), the Harrison Narcotic Act (1914) 
and the Narcotic Drug Import and Export Act (1922) instead of debilitating the trans-border 
trafficking pushed the illicit groups towards inventing new manners of introducing narcotics within 
the country (Recio, 2002:25). The prohibitionist approach, convoyed by the U.S., ignored “cultural 
domestic practices in many countries”, as for example the consumption of coca leaves in the 
Andean countries, which in the aftermath led to a hyper-criminalisation of all types of drugs 
(Lozano-Vazquez, 2015:51). The production and supply of narcotics functioned uninterruptedly 
with the criminal actors evolving from small cells of smugglers to more organised criminal groups. 
It was discovered that after the World War II, the narco-groups were able to smuggle drugs into the 
U.S. with personal airplanes which was a demonstration of their economic wealth (Recio, 2002:41).  
In 1994, with the signature of the NAFTA (North Atlantic Free Trade Agreement) the U.S.-
Mexico relationship was included within an economic framework. The exchange ratio between the 
three participating countries (the U.S., Canada and Mexico) increased notably during the last two 
decades. At the time, it seemed, that the economic ties had priority. As a matter of fact, Lupsha 
already declared that the Mexican drug trade was not considered a security priority “in the long 
term game of power-bloc politics” when compared with the economic benefits of a shared market 
(1991:56). However, as Stewart argues, the 2001 attack on the U.S. soil shifted the general attention 
on security and the free movement of people and goods was perceived as a threat with a subsequent 
request from the U.S.’ Congress for a major control of the borders (2014). The main argument was 
related to the fact that the techniques and routes used by the organised crime in order to smuggle 
could be learned by terrorists ready to prepare another massive attack (Serrano, 2007:231). The idea 
might seem quite paranoid in the aftermath, but at the time it permitted the U.S. to request from 
Mexico a major control on those broad ungoverned areas which were considered a haven for 
criminal activity (Serrano, 2007:231). In order to maintain its economic ties with the Northern 
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neighbours, “Mexico embraced initiatives on border security…that would have been simply 
unthinkable a few years before” (Serrano, 2007:232). One of the decisions seemed to be the 
unexpected public declaration of the War on Drugs and Organised Crime in 2006.  
Calderón’s decision was “unprecedented in Mexico” as never before federal military forces 
were deployed in order to openly combat organised crime (Hernández-Roy, 2007:31). It is argued 
that Mexico would never have started the WOD without the economic help that the country 
received from the U.S. through the Mérida Initiative, also known as Plan México, which amounts to 
1.5 billion dollars (Lakhani and Tirado, 2016). Furthermore, the U.S. went beyond economic help 
and provided intelligence and know-how support to the Mexican forces by applying counter-
insurgency protocols (adopted initially in Afghanistan) in order to fight organised crime (Sanchez, 
2013:473). Moreover, scholars such as Delgado-Ramos and Romano question the legality of the 
2006 election by contemplating a covert U.S’s interference and argue that in the aftermath Mexico 
experienced a rapid closeness between the state, the military and low-intensity-warfare advisors 
(2011:98). As a matter of fact, according to a leaked document from the U.S. Embassy in Mexico, 
the U.S. (before the elections) was willing to support a negotiation regarding the reform of the 
Mexican National Security Law which would have given the Mexican president the freedom of 
declaring a state of exception without consulting any other institutional body (Delgado-Ramos and 
Romano, 2011:99). It might be argued that the U.S. considered it necessary to interfere with the 
internal affairs of another sovereign state in order to reach its own political and economic agenda. 
Lakhani and Tirado argue that the WOD managed to “create an opaque security industry open to 
corruption at every level” which gains benefits from the tumultuous situation (2016). However 
considering that the WOD policy is solely the result of an external pressure relieves of any 
responsibility the subject that adopted it, the Mexican state. Therefore, it should be further analysed 
if the Mexican WOD had also a domestic rationale.  
2.3 Summary 
This chapter presented the important historical involvement of the U.S. in the counter-
narcotic efforts. It can be observed that the U.S. has a prohibitionist approach and the country used 
the Certification Process in order to constrain other states to participate in the WOD. However, as 
for the Colombian case, the U.S.’s counter-narcotic interventions gained importance solely after the 
end of the Cold War, when Communism was not considered a vital threat anymore. Scholars have 
condemned the aggressive WOD policy and its secretive agenda as it brought more complex 
problems and created an environment of insecurity and uncertainty. Delgado-Ramos and Romano 
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denounce the WOD approach by arguing that it leads to “the reorganisation of internal power 
relations between civilian and military groups” as the policy is hyper-militarised (2011:94). 
Kassab’s position is more drastic and argues that the WOD policy is implemented in order for the 
U.S. “to pursue its political and commercial interests" and the elimination of the drug problem has a 
secondary position (2015:3). Despite the unsuccessful results, the strategy continues to be 









































 Organised crime and the state are often two entities that exist within the same social fabric. 
The relation between the abovementioned actors is intricate and it can affect the entirety of society. 
One state’s approach to control the influence of organised crime is to accept a cohabitation system, 
whilst another method is to directly and violently attack the criminal groups and their illicit 
activities. The following literature review has a contextual purpose as it will offer the reader an 
overall presentation of the interaction between state, organised crime and populace which will 
permit to understand in what context the WOD was inserted. The literature review will present 
general concepts which, through the section, will be applied to the specific Mexican case. The focus 
on this specific region is due to the fact that generally Latin America is considered a peaceful 
continent, whilst at the same time it is commonly associated with drug cartels, violence and 
lawlessness and the author considered that this paradox needed a more in-depth analysis.  
 The secular existence of organised crime is not plain and simple to explain. Therefore, 
through the literature concepts such as “patron-client relationship”, “violence”, “corruption”, 
“territoriality”, and “social fabric” will be discussed. Considering the complexity of organised crime 
and counter-narcotic approaches there is no defined model that could be applied in order to 
understand how a specific society might react to a WOD strategy. Despite the lack of a 
mathematical design, the concepts analysed below are valuable in order to gain a better 
understanding of the situation that Mexico was experiencing when the WOD was declared.  
 The WOD is usually seen as an U.S. policy forced onto other countries (Arteaga, 2009). It is 
undeniable that the U.S. had an important role in defining security and more specifically, counter-
narcotics strategies in the region (as broadly discussed in Chapter II), but the current research 
intends to analyse the WOD strategy from a Latin American perspective. More specifically the 
literature review will analyse four identified main themes (during the early stages of the research) 
which are paramount for the organised crime’s survival in a period of turmoil: corruption, violence, 
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territory and popular support. The literature review will present those elements by analysing if they 
are present or applicable to the Mexican case study. Due to the lack of a major database that could 
contain an important number of analyses regarding the subject taken into consideration, the 
researcher consulted several sources. The researches taken into consideration were retrieved from 
Jstor, the libraries of University of Glasgow/Charles University, CIAO database and Advanced 
Search from Google by applying key words such as “organised crime”, “narco”, “war on drugs”, 
“drug war”, and “political corruption” among others. The most relevant researches for this specific 
case study are further discussed, but the author is aware that other valuable researches might exist.  
3.1 State, corruption and organised crime 
 From a security point of view, the state and criminal groups have three degrees of 
interaction: coexistence, disruption and elimination (Malone and Malone-Rowe, 2014:478). The 
Mexican state has generally opted for coexistence by agreeing for a pax mafiosa with the kingpins. 
The agreement implied that organised crime did not have the right to sell drugs within the Mexican 
territory and violence was to be maintained at a low level. An important aspect that should not be 
neglected when analysing the coexistence system is the endemic corruption that characterises it. 
Millard argues that “strong ties have been established, over the years, between the narco-business 
and the authorities” (1997:73) which implies that the tandem between authorities and criminal 
groups has historical roots. Also Beittel, specialised in Latin American affairs, argues that Mexico 
was subject to a “policy of accommodation” between the state and organised crime for too long and 
the glue of this relationship was corruption (2017:8). Nieto considers that the colonial hispanic 
elites were the first members of the society that introduced corruption as a method of “political 
language” and the indigenous people had to adapt to the new rule of law (2014:108). The colonialist 
period (ended in the XIXth century) was substituted in 1929 by one strong authoritarian party which 
exacerbated the use of corruption “as a tool of governance among the political elite” (Nieto, 
2014:108). Nieto argues that having a political position was the perfect manner to enrich yourself in 
a short period of time (2014). Also Shelley supports Nieto’s position by arguing that the post-
colonial period was characterised by “high-level and pervasive corruption rather than brute force” 
(2001:215). Moreover, it is argued that the one-party ruling protected Mexico from military 
regimes, but at the same time permitted the people in charge to create strong roots which 
developped further towards illicit activities (Shelley, 2001:215).  
 A coexistence system (also known as cohabitation) is dangerous as it is not clear who has 
the monopoly of power. Sanchez argues that, in cohabitation, the state has the power, which is 
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represented by a patron-client relationship, and the arrangement maintains violence at a socially 
bearable level. Such is possible because organised crime is protected at high-political levels and 
therefore it is free to operate peacefully and undisturbed (2013:470). Also Correa-Cabrera et al. 
agree with Sanchez’s position by arguing that the state decides which actors are allowed to remain 
and which ones are eliminated (2015:80). Rios’s research considers that the state can have the 
monopoly of power over organised crime only when the government is ruled by one party 
(2015:1433). Sanchez, Correa-Cabrera et al. and Rios argue the same, but for the specific Mexican 
case Rios’s research is the most relevant. Such is due to the fact that the research acknowledges that 
the state has the monopoly of power over illegal actors, but also specifies in which particular case.  
 Carpenter argues that organised crime is supported by the state primarily for an economic 
reason as criminal groups are considered “a wealth-generating enterprise”, but generally Mexican 
cartels have cooperated between them in order to create a peaceful environment for their businesses 
(2010:403). By affirming so, Carpenter considers that, in a cohabitation system, the organised crime 
has the monopoly of power. Carpenter’s analysis is paramount as it offers the possibility to 
understand the behaviour of the organised crime since the end of the cohabitation system which will 
be presented in the next section. Vellinga also analyses in-depth the relationship between political 
corruption, and criminal groups. In fact, the scholar argues that the parasitical relationship between 
the establishment and organised crime might be destabilised only by a direct attack towards the 
criminal groups. However, a violent offensive does not necessarily mean a positive outcome. 
Vellinga urges to be aware of the fact that destroying an operational criminal group might imply 
that single actors, the so-called couriers, might be interested in continuing the illicit activities with 
an increment in the level of violence due to the multi-polarisation of the illegal members and in that 
case the state would lose the monopoly of power (2000:177). Vellinga’s analysis is important for 
the research as it offers a first explanation regarding one of the outcomes of a WOD policy. 
3.2 State, violence and organised crime  
The pax mafiosa between the Mexican state and criminal organisations was disrupted in 
2006. Unexpectedly, the newly elected Mexican President declared the total WOD and deployed 
6,500 military personnel to his home state of Michoacán in order to contain a problem that until that 
specific moment was considered manageable with just the police’s intervention (Hernández-Roy, 
2007:31). Therefore, Mexico experienced an imminent change in the security agenda with a rapid 
shift from coexistence to elimination, without the mediating step of disruption. Malone and Malone-
Rowe are sceptic regarding the declaration of the WOD as “elimination is usually not desirable 
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from a state perspective, because it tends to be costly, difficult to achieve, and can usher in 
unintended consequences” (2014:478). Before 2006, organised crime’s activities were not 
considered a menace for Mexican institutions (Chabat, 2002:138). In fact, as was mentioned before, 
organised crime prefers cooperation with the legal institutions in exchange of freedom to operate 
(Carpenter, 2010:410). However, once the opposition party gained power there was an increment in 
drug-related crimes in Mexico (Correa-Cabrera et al., 2015:80). In support of the abovementioned 
statement, Rios declares that “it was as if one day Mexican criminal organisations suddenly 
discovered violence” (2015:1434). The reason that the violence sprung from nowhere is, according 
to Rios, the end of the pax mafiosa (2015:1436). The PAN party is identified by some scholars as 
the trigger of the violent wave that affected the country (Ferreira, 2016:44). In fact, in Dell’s 
analytical research it is stated that “violence in a municipality increases substantially after the close 
election of a PAN mayor and remains higher throughout the mayor’s term and beyond” 
(2015:1776). In fact, Imbusch et al. argue that “since 2006, Mexico has found itself confronted with 
a spiral of violence unknown since the days of the Mexican Revolution” (2011:103). 
Sanchez-Moreno considers that the Mexican state does not have anymore the monopoly of 
power and the level of violence is indeed decided by the criminal groups “according to the extent of 
their control, competition, and the protection schemes they are able to establish with state officials” 
(2015:39). Several scholars provide their own strategies in order to diminish cartels’ influence. 
Filippone considers that a criminal group should be “attacked politically, economically, and 
psychologically in conjunction with military and law enforcement measures” (1994:342). 
Filippone’s analysis is important because he is one of the few scholars that consider the violent 
approach as a reliable method, but only if combined with other elements. Bagley (2013), on the 
other hand, considers that the kingpin strategy could weaken drug cartels and argues that the death 
of Pablo Escobar, the head of the Medellín cartel, meant also the dissolution of the cartel 
(2013:102). In short, Bagley considers that there is no essential need to attack the cartel in its 
entirety, but just his leader. Bagley’s position is reflected in the Mexican WOD. Osorio also 
supports the violent approach by arguing that a WOD could weaken minor criminal groups 
(2015:1425). However, it is implied that a WOD will not harm historical well-established major 
criminal groups. Osorio’s position is interesting as he supports the violent approach, but at the same 
time is aware that major groups will probably not be affected by it. Osorio’s concept will be 
confuted through the research in order to understand if the WOD cannot indeed affect historical 
criminal groups. On the other hand, Flannery is a vivid critic of the WOD and, through his analysis, 
argues that killing, unexpectedly, the heads of the criminal groups creates a power vacuum where 
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criminal groups start a competition for leadership positions and resources (2013:182). Indeed, the 
militarised approach, without adequate political and judicial systems might increase the level of 
violence (Flannery, 2013:188). Flannery’s argumentation is important for the research per se as it 
offers a first explanation of the impact that the passage from cohabitation to destruction had on the 
Mexican society.  
 The existent literature focuses its attention mostly on the link between the WOD and the 
augmentation in violent crimes (Osorio, 2015) neglecting the reasons which led both to the WOD 
and to an augmentation in violence. Violence cannot be considered only a mere consequence of the 
presence of organised crime whitin a state as “violence stems primarily from the political, social 
and cultural context in which the organisations are operating” (Williams, 2009:324). Furtheremore, 
Williams argues that despite the common perception of violence perpetrated indistinctively by 
organised crime, criminal groups, as a matter of fact, prefer to avoid using violent methods against 
other groups or against the state itself. Williams’ position is supported by Longo’s analysis which 
concludes that organised crime “is an economic and financial entreprise which adopts rational, even 
if illegal, choices and strategies aimed at maximising benefits and reducing costs of its (illegal) 
business” (2010:18). In short, organised crime has an entrepreneurial stamp with limited interest for 
public display of violence. Williams’ analysis is paramount for the format of the following research 
as it considers violence within the socio-political and cultural factors of a society, and not as a 
separated feature. More specifically the research will benefit from two concepts developed through 
Williams’ analysis: transitional violence and the culture of lawlesness. Williams argues that 
transitional violence happens when “one set of arrangements dominated by the state…has broken 
down and although alternative codes of conduct between the state and organised crime are being 
developed they have still not been institutionalised” (2009:327), whilst he connects (surprisingly) 
the concept of machismo (=exaggerated masculinity) to an embedded cultural lawlesness. The 
concepts are important because they provide a first attempt of explaining the raising in violence 
since 2006. In fact, if combining a secular tradition of machismo with a period of violent turnmoil 
due to a change in the political spectrum, it would be easier to understand why the Mexican 
organised crime became so violent in a short amount of time. Moreover, the machista behaviour 
would explain the gruesome of the killings, which shifted from an impersonal killing to protect the 
bussiness to a more personal ferocity with public display of the casualties.  
 Schorr develops further the concept of violence as she considers that it cannot have only one 
explanation, but it should be rather analysed within a specific social context. Violence might be the 
result of fear, desire for more profit, competition between criminal groups or weakness of state’s 
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institutions (2013:57). Schorr’s research focuses on a particular type of violence, the so-called 
transitional violence, which verifies when the state decides to interrupt their sponsored protection to 
the organised crime (2013:58). Such is due to the fact that new political actors, not involved within 
the criminal activities, gain power and disrupt original agreements between the state and organised 
crime. Schorr’s explanation is useful for the following research as it presents the political change 
that Mexico experienced with the 2000s political elections where the opposition (PAN party), after 
a 71 years hiatus, obtained the power. Considering the elements previously analysed, the specific 
concept of “transitional violence” appears to be the most suitable for the current Mexican situation. 
3.3 State, territory and organised crime 
 Organised crime is able to put down roots in territories with specific features such as 
“pervasive rural and urban poverty, entrenched corruption in existing governmental structures, 
and…cultural association of drug-lords with modernity and progress” (Carpenter, 2010:415). 
Carpenter develops the entrepreneurial factor and argues that organised crime, in order to survive, 
needs a territorial presence within an economically poor environment. Moreover, Ungar argues that 
“in Latin America…organised crime maintains widespread control” for the abovementioned reasons 
(2013:1192). Carpenter’s research is paramount as it defines the territorial and cultural factors that 
ease the spread within a geographical region whereas other scholars consider the territorial aspect as 
less important when analysing organised crime’s behaviour. Flannery, for example, considers that 
criminal groups have no territorial interest and in response to a vital crisis the illicit activities will 
undergo through a diversification in order for the group to survive, rather than geographical 
delocalisation (2013:183). Flannery’s position is supported also by Correa-Cabrera et al.’s research, 
which argues that criminal groups are “fundamentally money-driven” (2015:83) with little attention 
for the territories they are operating in. Also, Sanchez-Moreno considers that “the illicit market in 
drugs by its nature generates massive profits for organised crime” (2015:39) which implies that 
criminal groups will always find a solution to continue their activities with little interest of 
physically possessing territories. However, by analysing Wikileaks documents, Aguilera affirms 
that the Mexican government was aware that, before 2006, some impoverished areas of the country 
were controlled by criminal groups (2013:29) which recalls Carpenter’s analysis.  
 The territorial aspect is paramount in order to understand organised crime’s behaviour. 
Chelluri argues that directly attacking territorial areas will remove the main source of income for 
the organised crime, the criminal routes utilised for human and drug trafficking and subsequently 
will weaken the criminal groups (2011:54). However, according to Osorio, losing territories for an 
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organised crime group would imply interference from neighbouring criminal groups interested in 
those specific areas which will result in higher levels of violence (2015:1404). In fact, it is argued 
by some scholars that violence in Latin America has a territorial aspect (Aguilera, 2013:21) which 
implies that violent acts are perpetrated only in some areas, interested by illicit activities. Ferreira, 
on the contrary, argues that the violence related to drug cartels does not necessarily follow an 
established path (2016:52). In fact, according to Ferreira there was a shift of violent acts from the 
historical northern border regions, to more peaceful central regions (2016:47). Ferreira’s research is 
important as it is a first attempt of arguing that, since the beginning of the WOD, violent actions 
spread across the country and cannot be relegated anymore to historical drug-producing areas. This 
is due to the fact that criminal groups started to expand in territories which were not subject to drug-
production or trafficking (Ferreira, 2016:47). Ferreira’s analysis is important as it considers the 
geographical delocalisation as a consequence of the WOD and it will be further analysed. The 
territorial aspect is added to previously mentioned phenomena such as cohabitation, elimination and 
transitional violence in order to be able to analyse in-depth the impact the WOD had on criminal 
groups and society in general. 
3.4 State, populace and organised crime 
 Few scholars consider the leverage that drug cartels have on local communities. In fact, 
Carpenter argues that a combination of economic benefits and protection might in “a certain degree 
of loyalty” (2010:407) mostly where governmental institutions are deficient. Correa-Cabrera et al. 
argue that since 2006, “some local governments have fallen under the control of criminal 
organisations” and there were instances when organised crime assumed the role of a parallel state 
(2015:78). The abovementioned affirmation is important for the research as it supports the idea that 
in some occasions organised crime groups managed to overcome the influence of the state. Drug-
cartels have generally avoided targeting civilians because it is considered that maintaining a certain 
level of wellbeing within the communities will avoid incursions from the state. Moreover, it is 
argued that drug cartels are interested in maintaining the lawful institutions along the parallel 
network created as they do not have any interest in offering a complete selection of social services 
(Carpenter, 2010:407). However, since the beginning of the WOD there was “a shift in the cartel’s 
preference for public and symbolic violence” (Carpenter, 2010:409). Regrettably, Carpenter does 
not offer further explanation about the reasons behind this change in organised crime’s behaviour. 
Carpenter’s lack of explanation invites the researcher to analyse the reason behind organised 




  Filippone, by analysing the WOD strategy adopted in Colombia, declared that the policy 
illustrated “a lack of understanding of the strength of the cocaine cartels and their positions in their 
societies” (1994:323). Furthermore, Filippone argues that the strategy adopted in Colombia was not 
strong enough to destroy an organisation “with the level of resources, sophistication, and influence 
of the Medellín cartel” (1994:324). In fact, Filippone argues that despite having had the drug-
leaders either in prison or dead, the criminal group continued to produce and export cocaine with 
the local support (1994:341). According to Filippone, identifying some names with the cartel, 
without analysing the mechanism that keeps a cartel alive and its importance for its own 
community, is the wrong approach (1994:342). Filippone certainly analyses a sensible subject but 
he does not offer an explanation regarding the causes of the popular support or if such support was 
coerced. Some scholars emphasize the fact that the drug industry “has become an integral part of 
societal dynamics” (Vellinga, 2000:125). It should not be neglected the fact that criminal groups 
often depict themselves as protectors of the communities they operate in (Ungar, 2013:1208). The 
concept of security corruption which implies that being protected by a narco-group is beneficial for 
the people (Ungar, 2013:1208) is important and should be further analysed as it offers a first 
glimpse of explanation about the intricate relationship between the populace and criminal groups.  
3.5 Summary  
 Historically, organised crime was entangled with the state and benefited of political 
protection (Astorga cited in Carpenter, 2010:404). Corruption and economic interests were at the 
basis of the agreement between the two subjects which permitted to control the level of violence. 
Therefore an augmentation in violence might be connected to the absence of coordination between 
criminal organisations and new political subjects (Correa-Cabrera et al., 2015:78; Rios, 2015:1449). 
When a WOD ends a long period of cohabitation between the state and organised crime, the high 
level of violence cannot be limited to the sole activity of criminal groups. It should be rather 
considered transitional violence as the criminal groups are adapting to the new environment. A 
political transformation might result in the weakening of the central government and the criminal 
groups could take advantage by extending their territorial presence and social influence. Scholars 
have generally focused on analysing subjects affected by the WOD separately, without considering 





Latin America, during the Cold War, was marginal within the world power structure, 
therefore it provided little interest for security-related theoretical analysis (Nolte and Wehner, 
2016:36). As Buzan and Hansen argue “theories are filters through which particular facts and events 
are granted more significance than others” (2009:44) and Latin American internal security aspects 
were eclipsed by the hegemonic presence of the U.S. Moreover, according to Hurrell, in the post-
Cold War period, the continent continued being irrelevant in the security studies field due to the fact 
that it lacked both military crises and strategic centrality (cited in Buzan and Hansen, 2009:179). 
Considering that the Latin American reality was generally analysed within the realist perspective, 
Hurrell’s affirmation has a grain of truth. However, in the last three decades Latin American 
security studies have experienced a growing interest both by national and international scholars 
which distanced themselves from the realist perspective (Tickner, 2016:67). Merke affirms that the 
current academic interest addressed towards Latin America is due to the fact that the region is 
experiencing a mix of old and new security issues and such cannot be analysed through the static 
realist lens (2016:92). Moreover, such an important broadening of the security agenda permitted 
“analysts to refer to both traditional and non-traditional threats” by applying a critical view on 
different subjects (Kacowicz and Mares, 2016:26). Norden, more specifically, argues that the Latin 
American reality is challenged by specific issues such as “Mexico’s violent narcotics cartels, 
guerrillas on the Ecuadorian border, and gang violence in Central America” (2016:251) which 
challenge the traditional security concepts. The following section will incorporate the Latin 
American region within a theoretical framework. The constructivist theory will be analysed in 
relation with the broadening concept of the security menaces in Latin America and two specific 
theories (securitisation theory and ungoverned space) will be presented in order to explain how are 





4.1 Broadening security concepts and constructivism 
The end of the Cold War requested a reconceptualization of security threats by focusing also 
on elements other than the state (Kassab, 2015:27). The realist view, which is state-centric, had 
difficulties in explaining both the presence of non-state actors as well as their violent activities 
against the state (Peoples and Vaughan-Williams, 2010:54). For the specific Latin American region, 
Hurrell declares that “there are increasingly common and increasingly strident arguments that 
security should be broadened to include drug trafficking, drug-related violence and criminality” 
(1998:541). Also Buzan and Hansen argue that, besides military, equal emphasis should be given to 
“domestic and trans-border threats” (2009:188). In fact, with the Managua Declaration of 2006, the 
Latin American ministers of defence declared that “terrorism, drug trafficking, human trafficking, 
organised crime, money laundering, corruption, and the proliferation of small arms and light 
weapons all pose significant threats to Latin American security” (cited in Kacowicz and Mares, 
2016:26). This declaration is important as it exits the realist competition between states and enters 
in a new dimension, of an interconnected regional security. The realist view focused on “survival, 
autonomy and protection from external forces” does not have the instruments of analysing the 
current menaces (Kassab, 2015:26). The main reasons for taking the distances from the realist 
perspective is the fact that, for the specific Mexican case, both the state and the population are 
menaced by an internal threat. As a matter of fact, the new security menaces will be analysed within 
a constructivist framework which is considered a more pertinent theory. 
 
Constructivism, since the end of the Cold-War period, is “one of the dominant modes of 
analysis in international relations and security studies” (Agius, 2013:102). The constructivist theory 
considers that subjects behave according to their own social fabric, which changes from one reality 
to another and therefore some aspects of International Relations (such as enmity or collaboration 
between states) were built throughout the time rather than being given concepts (Durepos et al., 
2010:220). The reason of analysing Latin America within the constructivist framework is the fact 
that it permits to analyse in-depth a phenomenon such as the WOD from a socio-political and 
historical point of view. This reasoning is supported by Reus-Smit which argues that with 
constructivism “the social, historical and normative have returned to the centre stage of debate” 
(Reus-Smit, 2009:229). The WOD is a response to a new type of security menace which has to be 
analysed within its own specific reality. In fact, Agius confirms that “interests are not fixed over 
time…and are open to change and revision” (2013:89), whereas McDonald considers security as “a 
social construction” (2013:65). What is affirmed, within the constructivist dialectic, is that the 
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society evolves and so do threats. As it was mentioned in the second chapter, the security interests 
have changed through the time, passing from communism to broader issues such as organised crime 
and drug-trafficking (among others).  
 
Furthermore, constructivism focuses on an important aspect of today’s society and in fact, 
argues that the use of language is important as a particular issue can be institutionalised through 
rhetoric (Durepos et al., 2010:223). A political discourse, if successful, can construct anything from 
scratch, including a new security menace (Huysmans, 2002:45). Agius explores more the 
importance of communication by asserting that language forms speech acts which could be divided 
in: “assertions, directives, and commitments” (2013:98). If considering the WOD strategy, despite 
being applied to different realities, it generally initiates with a commitment where the person in 
charge promises that the security issues related to narco-trafficking or organised crime will be 
solved (Salazar, 2012). The security language is important to be taken in consideration as it has the 
ability of providing “a different picture about a social problem or a source of insecurity” (Agius, 
2013:98). McDonald considers that specific political actors, within a reality, define what values 
should be protected and through a constructed speech the public is informed about their decision 
(2013:69). It is clear that, in the WOD strategy, the security language should be carefully analysed. 
In fact, one brief remark is certainly required. It is indeed curious how the term “war” is utilised 
when referring to a non-bellicose event which is officially a counter-narcotic strategy. Booth argues 
that the “war” rhetoric is extremely influential at a political and societal level (cited in Sanchez, 
2013:475). Moreover, Sanchez argues that the sole action of accepting the war rhetoric gives 
freedom to the political spectrum to go beyond its constitutional powers (2013:475). In Latin 
America, Salazar argues that the state has utilised the “war” rhetoric in public speeches in order to 
depict the drug problem as a menace that justified the extraordinary security mechanisms put in 
place in the afterwards (2012). The constructivist theory permits to analyse the impact that a term, 
“war”, might have in the long term. Security, after the end of a predominant realist view, has 
broadened its significance and constructivism helps to analyse security issues by including them 
within their own “social and historical context” (McDonald, 2013:65). The Mexican case-study will 
be analysed within the securitisation theory, which Buzan defined as “radically constructivist” 






4.2 Securitisation theory 
The premise of the securitisation theory is that “no issue is essentially a menace” (Balzacq, 
2010:1; Buzan et al., 1998:24), but with the proper political discourse it can become one. 
Furthermore, Buzan et al. argue that an existential threat, if successful presented, “legitimises the 
use of exceptional political measures” (cited in Peoples and Vaughan-Williams, 2010:76). In fact, 
when a security issue is securitised it is treated with the same urgency as a military threat (Buzan et 
al., 1998:23) and "will receive the necessary financial resources" (Bagley et al., 2015:XIV). This 
concept might be the perfect explanation for the state of emergency enacted by the former Mexican 
President, Felipe Calderón in 2006. According to Buzan et al. a securitisation process is “always a 
political choice” (1998:29). More precisely, Buzan et al. declared that the securitisation happens 
through three steps: 
 
“Nonpoliticised (the issue is not a political issue)  Politicised (the issue 
is part of the public policy debate)  Securitised (the issue is considered 
an existential threat and … justifies responses that go beyond normal 
political practices)” (Buzan and Hansen, 2009:214) 
 
Waever argues that the process presented by Buzan et al. should start with a “speech act”. 
More precisely, Waever declares that such happens “when an issue not previously thought as a 
security threat comes to be spoken of as security issue by important political actors” (cited in 
Peoples and Vaughan-Williams, 2010:78). That is exactly what happened when Felipe Calderón 
declared, all of a sudden, that narco-groups were a threat to national security. However, Lowenheim 
argues that drug trafficking is not an essential menace towards the state (2002:535). Chabat shares 
Lowenheim’s position by arguing that before the declaration of a WOD, drugs per se were not 
considered a social threat (2002:146). However, it is argued that in order to have an accomplished 
securitisation the audience receiving the “speech act” has to be impressed (Balzacq, 2010:9). Also 
Kassab declares that only a successful speech act can take an issue “from the level of criminality to 
the level of war” by appealing to arguments such as freedom, personal values (or fears) and 
democracy (2015:28). In fact, the Mexican society was aware of the existence of organised crime 
but, by politicising it, the former Mexican President managed to securitise the issue and to justify 
the start of the WOD. Calderón’s political discourse was, in fact, pointing towards family values 
and parental love in order to gain the public’s support by utilising the slogan “para que la droga no 




The three “felicity conditions” for a successful securitisation established by Waever are 
found within the Mexican case. First of all, the legitimation of adopting extraordinary measures 
when there is an existential threat (the cartels). Second of all, the personality securitising the issue 
has a position of authority and has enough political power to convince an audience (Felipe 
Calderón). And lastly, if the existential threat “carry historical connotations of threat, danger, and 
harm” it will be easier to convince an audience (Peoples and Vaughan-Williams, 2010:79). If 
considering the long history of violence perpetrated by the organised crime in Latin America, Felipe 
Calderón was in the position of easily having the public’s acceptance for the WOD policy.  
 
The securitisation discourse albeit being important, considering the authoritarian and un-
democratic regimes typical of Latin America, is constantly neglected in the security studies field 
(Tickner, 2016:72). Furthermore, the scholar argues that there is no analysis of the political impact 
of the security “speech acts in terms of militarisation and de-democratisation” and subsequently, 
there is no analysis of “what or who is to be secured” (2016:72). According to Buzan and Waever, 
the securitisation theory has a constructivist connotation considering the fact that an issue becomes 
a menace solely after a well-constructed act speech (cited in Balzacq, 2010:56). According to Buzan 
et al., “security is the move that takes politics beyond the established rules of the game and frames 
the issues either as a special kind of politics or as above politics” (1998:23). Moreover, it is argued 
that when something of a non-military nature threatens the sovereignty of a state, it could be 
considered a security issue (Buzan et al., 1998:22). For Hurrell, due to the complexity of the 
dynamic and interconnected world we live in, a referent object cannot be exclusively the state, but 
this concept has to be applied to “individuals and collectivities” (1998:542).  
 
More security does not necessarily mean a better situation. In fact, the securitisation of an 
issue, due to the lack of time and space for discussions, “brings into play a particular, militarised 
mode of thinking” (Peoples and Vaughan-Williams, 2010:83). Tickner also supports this position 
by arguing that “securitisation is often adverse to democracy” (2016:68) and adopting exceptional 
extra-legal measures might lead to a militarisation of the issue. Tickner defines militarisation “as a 
process by which societal acceptance of military participation and militaristic means for solving 
distinct problems becomes normalised” (2016:75). Emmers criticises securitisation by arguing that, 
in a society experiencing this process, the militaries and special security forces, might gain major 
powers and undermine the civilian control of the society (2013:136). Needless to say that Mexico 
experienced an over-militarisation of the WOD policy which led to a decade long on-going conflict. 
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Considering that Mexico is a newly formed democracy after 71 years of one-ruling party, the 
securitisation of the drug problem and its hyper-militarisation is worrisome.  
 
4.3 Ungoverned spaces 
A failed state is defined as being unable of providing security and public goods to its 
citizens, collecting taxes, and implement policies (Debiel and Lambach, 2010:159). Latin America, 
despite frequent governance flaws, has no failed state within its continent and in fact, Hurrell invites 
to avoid exaggerations when analysing state capacity in Latin America (1998:542). For this reason, 
the research will focus on the theoretical concept of ungoverned spaces which limits security issues 
to a local (and not national) level. More specifically, the research will consider the definition 
provided by Peters and Rabasa which define ungoverned spaces as “territories…outside the control 
of government that holds nominal sovereignty over the territory in question” (2007:4). However, 
Peters and Rabasa clarify that those specific territories are governable: the problem is that the state 
per se is not capable or willing to do so (2007:4). In fact, as Clunan and Trinkunas noticed “all 
ungoverned spaces are actually governed”, but not always by the State (2016:106).  
 
Latin America has generally combined spaces with high-state presence and ungoverned 
areas (Clunan and Trinkunas, 2016:99). Moreover, as Font and Rufi argue, Latin America is still 
experiencing a chaotic coexistence between fully controlled areas and ungovernable zones that have 
their own internal logic (cited in Florido Alejo and Preciado Coronado, 2014:71). After the third 
wave of democratisation during the 1980s, former authoritarian Latin American states experienced 
a democratisation process which created a power vacuum, subsequently filled by “illicit economies 
and actors” which decided to provide governance functions (Clunan and Trinkunas, 2016:100). It is 
certainly evident that ungoverned spaces are a threat towards the sovereignty of a state and the lack 
of control permits the flourishing of illegal activities (Hurrell, 1998:542). Those ungoverned spaces 
became safe areas which permit lawless actors to operate undisturbed (Lamb, 2008:17). Certainly 
globalisation and technological innovation improved the capabilities of non-state actors to 
“mobilise, exercise influence, and provide governance outside the state” (Clunan and Trinkunas, 
2016:101). The majority of ungoverned spaces are located along the national borders as their 
distance from the core permits illicit actors “to pursue their own interests…that are predatory or 
damaging” (Clunan and Trinkunas, 2016:103). An infamous example is the U.S.-Mexico border. 
Consequently, the illicit activities create a fertile ground for conflict with both the state and other 
criminal competitors (Insight Crime, 2011). Also, criminal actors create a type of patronage within 
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the communities in order to gain popular support and shield themselves “from the occasional 
interest of the state” (Clunan and Trinkunas, 2016:104). Undoubtedly, popular support is gained 
from a combination of welfare benefits and violence, the so-called security-corruption (Williams, 
2016:271). Ungoverned areas might be also a reason of diplomatic dispute between two states and 
the stronger state might oblige the weaker to adopt a strong-hand policy in order to eliminate the 
threat that an ungoverned area might pose (Lamb, 2008:54). According to Clunan and Trinkunas 
that was one of the mechanisms behind the Mexican WOD. 
 
4.4 Summary 
The Latin American continent is underrepresented in the security studies field. The little 
interest might be related to the fact that it was always perceived as an extension of the U.S.’s Grand 
Strategy and even the little attention offered by the Western scholars was mostly related to the 
North-South unilateral communication. However, as it was discussed in this chapter, Latin America 
is gaining relevance due to the end of a bi-polarised world and a subsequent shift in the regional 
security agenda. The broadening of the security agenda includes new actors and new security 
threats, separated from the realist view (Merke, 2016:92). However, the inclusion of new menaces 
within the security discourse provides an advantageous environment for securitisation. The chapter 
argues that the Mexican WOD was constructed through the security language. Moreover, the 
research will have the aim to understand if Hurrell’s  declaration- “generally, a certain issue gains 
political importance when there is a combination of state power and interests rather than an 
objective concern” (1998:531) -might be applied to this specific case study. The last aspect taken 
into consideration is the theoretical concept of “ungoverned space” which diminishes the role of the 
state and gives free space of action to illicit actors. The research intends to analyse how the 









































The WOD policy, implemented in Mexico in 2006, had a strong impact on the entirety of 
the society. Undoubtedly, the conflict has influenced every aspect of the country, exacerbating the 
level of insecurity and uncertainty (ESOC, 2017). A decade later, the WOD strategy did not create 
the peaceful and secure environment promised by the former Mexican president, Felipe Calderón 
(Ortega, 2016). The complexity of the WOD policy is linked with the multiple actors involved in 
the process: the state, the criminal organisations and the population (AFP, 2016). The following 
research intends to analyse the impact of the WOD on the Mexican society, with a particular focus 
on the infamously known cartels. It is paramount to understand the actors and rationale behind the 
WOD, the pursued strategy and the specific outcomes. The research has the aim to respond to a 
precise central question: “Did the WOD strategy empower drug cartels instead of debilitating 
them?” The analysis is arduous due to the complexity of the phenomenon taken into consideration. 
The first section of the chapter will introduce the overall methodological approach used to examine 
the research question and in the second part of the chapter an explanation of the main sources for 
data-gathering will be provided.  
 
The WOD policy has been adopted by many Latin American countries affected by drug 
production. Albeit being a historical approach, each WOD has its peculiarities. For this reason the 
research will focus on a specific case because, as Simons argues, “studying the singular… is to 
understand the uniqueness of the case itself” (2014:466). Indeed, studying a particular event 
provides the freedom of analysing the mechanisms behind it (Gerring, 2011:1135). The decision of 
focusing on a unique case study is driven from the desire of providing an exhaustive explanation 
and understanding the peculiarities of this specific example. In fact, focusing on a single case study 
provides the researcher with the opportunity to an “in-depth exploration from multiple perspectives” 
(Simons, 2014:457). The following research will be, as Stake defines it, an “intrinsic case study” 
(cited in Simons, 2014:459) which signifies that the case is analysed in order to gain an in-depth 
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knowledge about the case itself. The abovementioned typology of case study was chosen because it 
is “exploratory in nature” and helps the researcher to avoid generalisation (Durepos et al., 
2010:240). Generalising an event might be considered an easy escape route as it might permit 
applying a specific model to all Latin American countries that have experienced a WOD on national 
soil. However, as it was mentioned, all WOD in Latin America are different from each other (HRW, 
2017). Despite focusing on one specific case study, Mexico is not extrapolated from its regional 
context. As it was discussed in the previous chapters, the research acknowledges the importance of 
actors such as the U.S. or other WOD policies. Furthermore, the analysis of the specific Mexican 
case might be beneficial for future research regarding other WOD policies as “the intensive study of 
a single case has the purpose of understanding a larger class of cases” (Gerring, 2011:1138). 
 
The complexity of the argument taken into consideration asserts that different paths should 
be followed in order to gain a better understanding of the problem as well as being able to answer 
the research question without neglecting important details. The research will have a qualitative 
approach. A frequent critique towards qualitative research is that it “simply takes various accounts 
or observations of some domain of interest and weaves them into a narrative with little or no 
conceptual depth or practical relevance” (Bryant, 2014:120). For this reason, the research will be 
contextualised and situated within an auxiliary analysis of consistent quantitative data. The 
quantitative support for the qualitative research is related to the complexity of the subject and to the 
fact that the research has no intention of being a plain narration of the Mexican WOD. Likewise, the 
researcher considered that neither a pure quantitative analysis of data will be able to present the 
complexity of the WOD policy, mostly regarding the socio-political aspects of the abovementioned 
strategy. In fact, Simons argues against the exclusive analysis of data as the only method of research 
as it is limiting to analyse just numbers without a holistic approach (2014:464). More explicitly, the 
author argues that there is more than numbers and a certain degree of attention should be devolved 
towards interpretation which, as a “more intuitive process”, (Simons, 2014:464) will allow the 
researcher to gain more in-depth knowledge about a specific issue.  
 
The research per se will be focused, from a qualitative point of view, on the method of 
content analysis by examining published reports, newspapers, web pages and other forms of 
documentation. As it can be easily understood a long-term policy as the WOD has provided a 
massive quantity of written sources ranging from official documents to interviews and researches 
(among others). A content analysis method is particularly helpful in “intensive studies producing 
rich descriptions of a single phenomenon” (Bowen, 2009:29) and for this reason it was considered 
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as the most prolific method to be engaged when analysing the WOD impact in Mexico. Simons 
(2014) considers the analysis of documents as paramount. In fact, the author declared that it “is 
useful for establishing what historical antecedents might exist to provide a springboard for 
contemporaneous data gathering” (2014:463). Moreover, written documents might be able to 
“provide supplementary research data” (Bowen, 2009:30). The research, during the initial stages, 
adopted the so-called progressive focusing strategy. The strategy, as defined by Parlett and 
Hamilton (cited in Simons, 2014:464) implies identifying specific themes which could be further 
analysed in order to provide findings. In fact, during the preliminary part of the study, the 
researcher was focused on analysing existing documents regarding the WOD in Latin America in 
order to identify main themes that could be beneficial in answering the research question. More 
specifically, the research focused on applying a thematic analysis method which identified specific 
emerging themes (violence, political corruption, illicit activities, social fabric and territoriality) that 
in the end will become the definitive categories for analysis (Bowen, 2009:32). Each of the 
abovementioned elements will be analysed, and the combination of the findings will attempt to 
answer if the WOD empowered cartels rather than debilitating them.  
 
An important aspect of analysing written sources is the fact that they are stable. In fact, as 
Bowen argues, the presence of a researcher “does not alter what is being studied” (2009:31) and 
more importantly the documents taken into consideration can be analysed further in time. Another 
positive aspect of utilising documents as a source of primary data is the exact details that they offer, 
such as names, locations or specific details (Durepos et al., 2010:226). Moreover, written sources 
are able to cover a broad range of events (Bowen, 2009:31). Nonetheless, the sole analysis of 
documents could be limiting as they might provide insufficient information in order to fully analyse 
the researched issue (Bowen, 2009:32). Also, there is always a risk of lack of authenticity or 
accuracy (Bowen, 2009:32). For this reason, the documents taken into consideration will be 
collected from independent and international sources. The challenging aspect of gathering 
information from international organisations is the fact that those organisations (World Bank and 
the United Nations in primis) retrieve their information from the national governments which 
sometimes result in poor or incomplete data, whilst independent organisations often do not have the 
resources to offer a total coverage about a particular subject. In fact the combination between 
independent and governmental data will be crucial for the main analysis of the following research. 
Additionally, the quantitative data as per below will have the function of providing a visual support 




5.1 Sources for quantitative and qualitative analysis 
The major pools of retrieving quantitative data are the LatinoBarometro and NarcoData by 
Animal Politico. The Latinobarometro has the main goal of analysing the socio-political and 
economic situation in all Hispanic countries (including Spain) separately. The data is gathered at a 
national level through surveys and the appeal of Latinobarometro is its independence from any form 
of political incursion. The Latinobarometro databases were considered because they cover the 
timeframe 2006-2016 which is of vital interest for this research. The Latinobarometro’s policy is 
full transparency and in fact, it offers both an already existing online analysis as well as raw data to 
be independently analysed. More specifically, the quantitative data taken into consideration is 
focused on the perception the populace has regarding the most salient problems within the country. 
Another major database of quantitative data that will be analysed is the dataset offered by the 
independent newspaper Animal Politico. The newspaper started a project called NarcoData which 
has the aim of analysing the evolution of Mexican organised crime throughout time. The datasets 
are extremely valuable for this research as they are retrieved from both official databases and 
independent organisations and cover the timeframe considered in the research. Moreover, 
Narcodata is the first project that focuses on quantitative data regarding exclusively organised 
crime. The analysis and interpretation of the Animal Politico’s datasets will provide a quantitative 
support for a better understanding of the geographical location of the organised crime and the 
economic capacity of their illicit activities.  
 
From a qualitative point of view, the researcher will analyse the data provided by the 
Institute for Peace and Economics (IEP). The Institute, established in 2007, offers a wide range of 
documentation regarding the impact of organised crime on Mexico’s economy since the beginning 
of the WOD and the archives are freely consultable. The publications will be individually analysed 
and the conclusions will be compared with the quantitative datasets taken into consideration. The 
content analysis will be focused also on online blogs and investigative journals. The major sources 
taken into consideration will be Insight Crime and Proceso. A content analysis is a long and tedious 
process as each source has to be analysed individually. In order to ease the research, in the 
preliminary part of the study several key-words, both in Spanish and English, were identified 
(“organised crime”, “narco”, “matanza”, “kingpin”, “violence”, “war on drugs”, “Mexico”) and 





5.2 Research limitations 
 The main limitation when researching the WOD in Mexico is certainly the realistic lack of 
data and the lack of transparency in the existing data. In fact, Heinle et al. argue that “because of the 
limitations of government data—and a lack of transparency on how these data are collected—
several media sources, non-governmental organisations, and researchers conduct their own 
independent monitoring” which emphasizes the difficulty that a researcher has when analysing the 
WOD situation in Mexico (2015:44). The many blind spots in the governmental databases are filled 
by independent researches. However, the dispersion of data slows both the gathering process and 
the analysis of data. Another important limitation is the fact that there is a randomised coverage 
along the years. One reason for considering the important datasets that the United Nations Office on 
Drugs and Crime (UNODC) has is that the data is available for the entirety of the 2006-2016 
timeframe. This aspect is important considering that since the beginning of the following research, 
very few databases covering the entirety of the interested period were found. Imbusch et al. are 
aware of the lack of reliable data regarding specific topics by arguing that “there are no 
comprehensive studies on violence in Mexico” (2011:103). Ferreira confirms the difficulties that 
researchers have when analysing the criminal groups by declaring: 
“Still, there are many gaps in the data on the victims of violence associated 
with organised crime. Both government and independent data exclude 
finer details that would lend a better understanding of violent crime. For 
example, there is no information about the authorship of killings, making it 
impossible to determine whether the victims were killed by the military or 
the police, or in clashes between organised crime groups. Additionally, 
there are still many missing persons whose fate remains unknown” 
(Ferreira, 2016:56).  
Such is important in order to understand the difficulties that a researcher encounters while analysing 
the Mexican reality. In fact, obtaining relevant data is the main impediment of any research related 
with the effects of the WOD in Mexico. Another evident gap in the literature is the lack of analysis 
regarding the interaction between organised crime and the population. There is a certain tendency to 
depict people as passive actors which suffer in silence the atrocities perpetrated by the organised 
crime or the state. For this reason, the following research aims to present the active responses of the 
population in order to remove the victim stigma. The author is aware that the available research is 
mostly qualitative rather than quantitative which might lead to a hyper-analysis of the problem. 
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However, the online resources provided by organisations such as the UNODC, Transparency 
International, NarcoData or the Institute for Peace and Economics (among others) will limit the 
existing quantitative data gap and will help to better analyse the qualitative information. 
Undoubtedly, the uncertainty and the illegality will never permit to have a complete idea about the 
actual numbers of the drug empire considering that the statistics regarding drug industry “will never 
be more than educated guesses” (Vellinga, 2000:123). Nonetheless, such limits should not 

















The impact of the War on Drugs in 
Mexico 
Mexico’s geographical position, between the U.S. (the world’s largest drug-consumer) and 
several production countries, explains to some extent its main role within the drug chain. Williams 
considers Mexico’s position as being a “location curse” which inevitably led to the integration of 
the country within the drug trade (2009:325) as it was discussed in Chapter II. However, if the drug 
trade was the consequence of a combination between geographical location and a high demand of 
drugs, the WOD approach is more difficult to explain. After the experience in Colombia, scholars 
have invited to critically consider the WOD policy and its indiscriminate application. Already in 
2002 Chabat declared that Mexico’s institutions had “very little margin for manoeuvre in the war on 
drugs” (135). Chabat questioned the possibility of strengthening the counter-narcotics strategy by 
denouncing the dangerousness of declaring “total war on drugs” against criminal organisations 
when not being institutionally and militarily ready to respond to the criminal groups’ reactions as it 
was “reasonable to expect higher levels of violence” (2002:145). Thus, even before the beginning of 
the WOD there was a vivid concern that the Mexican government was not ready. Nonetheless, in 
2006, the newly elected Mexican president has openly declared the war against drugs and organised 
crime. Felipe Calderón was contested from the first moment and was accused of stealing the 
presidency from another candidate, Andrés Manuel López Obrador. Surprisingly, the opposition 
barricaded inside the Congress and refused to accept the ceremonial instalment of the new president 
(Tuckman, 2006). Such behaviour was justified by the fact that Calderón won the elections by a 
margin of solely 0.56% (Miyar, 2016:215). Aguilera argues that the counter-narcotics strategy 
intended “to legitimise an administration questioned from the beginning” (2013:29) rather than 
diminishing the influence of criminal groups. The WOD was not a prominent objective of Felipe 
Calderón’s political campaign. In fact, only after being elected, Calderón shifted his political 
agenda and neglected his electoral promises, such as reducing unemployment and reviving the 
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internal market and instead focused on the WOD by deploying troops in urban areas (Murataya et 
al., 2013:350). If the WOD seemed unexpected for the domestic public, the violent response from 
the criminal groups was foreseen by many experts (Murataya et al., 2013:351).  
 
 The public declaration of the WOD had a strong impact on the society as a whole. It is 
difficult to imagine that such a violent strategy as the WOD would have been capable to not affect 
the Mexican population. The initial approach was convincing the nation that the fight was going to 
be rapid, but the total participation of the community was vital. The term “war” was used “to 
describe a battle that could be decisively won with the support, participation, and sacrifices of the 
Mexican people” in combination with a massive implementation of technology and intelligence 
(Regidor cited in Sanchez, 2013:476). The constructed political discourses managed to depict 
cartels and their illicit activities, more specifically drug-trafficking, as a threat whereas before these 
were considered solely a social disturbance. The constructivist approach is more evident when 
considering the information provided by Latinobarometro (2016). Its data shows that the Mexican 
population, in 2006, was not worried about drug trafficking, and elements such as public security, 
poverty and corruption were more salient. Moreover, during the last decade, drug-trafficking 
continued being considered a minor issue (as can be observed in Appendix A). Nevertheless the 
violent strategy was adopted, and a decade later the country is still involved in the WOD.  
 The following section aims to provide an exhaustive overview of the consequences of the 
abovementioned strategy. The chapter will focus mainly on the impact of the WOD on organised 
crime (known informally as cartels), criminal groups’ response and where the cartels currently are. 
However, the state and the cartels are not two separated entities: they coexist within a society which 
was directly involved, often caught between the two fires, and suffered casualties and losses. 
Therefore, the section will provide an explanation for the socio-economic and territorial impact of 
the WOD and how the country is responding after a decade of an on-going conflict. The situation is 
complex as it involved every social level, from the rural mountainous areas of the Northern state of 
Sinaloa to the urban rich areas of Mexico City. Therefore, for a better comprehension regarding the 
multiple effects of the WOD, the chapter will present a detailed timeline and multiple info-graphic 
representations.  
6.1 The War on Drugs and diversification 
 The election of a member of the opposition party in the 2000s, Vincente Fox (PAN), started 
a democratisation process within the country which was a menace for the pax mafiosa between the 
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state and organised crime. Miyar considers that, in 2000, officially started the decentralisation of the 
political power. The democratisation process had slowly led to the loss of power that the central 
government had over the cartels which destabilised the apparent peaceful environment (2016:215). 
It is argued that the rising level of insecurity and instability within Mexico might be connected to 
the fact that “the informal arrangements established between the organised crime groups and the 
government” were dismantled after seven decades of cohabitation (Chabat, 2015:104). In short, 
with the appearance of a new political actor the organised crime lost their institutional point of 
reference. Therefore when Calderón barely won the elections in 2006 Mexico was already in a 
destabilising situation. The country was experiencing a democratisation process which led to a 
decentralisation of institutional power and the political insecurity was appealing for the criminal 
groups as they were able to operate outside the control of the state. Considering the political 
situation at the time and the low popular support, the presidency decided to unite the country 
against a common enemy in order to obtain legitimacy which confirms that the WOD policy had 
indeed a domestic rationale.  
 Despite the new political arrangement Mexico was forced to face the phantoms of the past. 
During the 70 years of PRI-ruling, corruption was “a key factor which facilitated a relatively 
peaceful, non-violent period of drug trafficking operations in Mexico” (Morris, 2013:196). As 
Lupsha argues, the Mexican justice system was for a long time a legal extension of the organised 
crime and had an intermediary function between cartels and the government (cited in Morris, 
2013:205). It is indeed almost impossible for organised crime to operate without corrupting the 
legal institutions. Drug cartels are generally interested in maximising their profits in the quickest 
manner possible, but they need protection from the public officers which is generally obtained 
through corruption (Beittel, 2013:6). Calderón’s administration discovered soon enough that 
corruption was well-rooted in the political establishment and such led to various anticorruption 
campaigns. One of the most important operations during the early stages of the WOD was 
“Operation Cleanup” (2008) which aimed at eliminating corrupt officials. The operation had some 
positive outcomes and in fact it led to the arrest of “deputy attorney general in charge of fighting 
drug trafficking” and “the head of Interpol Mexico” among other high located figures (Medel and 
Thoumi, 2014:15). Also, during the abovementioned operation, it was discovered that the Special 
Investigations Unit on Organised Crime was infiltrated by members of the Beltran Leyva cartel 
which had the function of deviating the research towards other criminal groups (Williams, 
2009:330). This operation did not end the endemic corruption typical of the Mexican system, but it 
did indeed emphasize the complexity of the problem considering the fact that people in charge of 
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combating illicit activities were vulnerable and corruptible in the first place. Moreover, from the 25 
high located figures arrested, only 13 were formally incriminated and their detention was under 5 
years of prison (Proceso, 2013). Such blunt sentences are a representation of the weakness of the 
Mexican judicial system and Chabat’s warning should be recalled as the scholar considered Mexico 
as institutionally not prepared for the WOD. 
Quantifying quantitatively the amount of corruption is certainly difficult, but for the 
Mexican case is near to impossible. The most important economic organisation, the World Bank, 
despite having a “corruption” variable, does not have any data to provide for Mexico. For this 
reason it is difficult to argue whether Calderón’s anti-corruption campaign was a success, but 
fortunately the Mexico Peace Index and Transparency International provide some data regarding 
population’s perception about corruption which slightly helps to understand the current situation. 
As it can be observed both sources present an improvement regarding the overall perception (Figure 
1 and 2) which might represent a general diminution of corruption, but it has to be mentioned that 
perceptions cannot be accounted as a definitive claim. Also it should be taken into consideration 
that the majority of the Mexican population has conflicted sentiments regarding corruption. As 
Nieto explained it: “on one hand, some people accept it as a measure to speed up administrative, 
legal or economic procedures, or to avoid the costs of the law. On the other hand, others refuse it as 
they recognise corruption’s perverse effects on the whole society” (2014:109). Therefore the overall 
perception regarding corruption has to be handled carefully considering that people do not dismiss it 
completely.  
 
The horizontal axis represents the 2011-
2016 timeframe, whilst the vertical axis 
represents the percentage of the 
population that took the survey. As it can 
be observed, since 2014 there is a 
decrement in the percentage of people 
that consider the different law-







Figure 1. Perception of Law-Enforcement Entities as 
being “not corrupt” 2011-2016 
Source: Mexico Peace Index, 2017 
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The horizontal axis represents the values of the 
Corruption Perception Index developed by 
Transparency International where 0=very 
corrupt and 100=very clean, whilst the vertical 
axis represents the 2006-2016 timeframe. 
Mexico’s best result was in 2008 where the 
country was given 36 points. However, the latest 
available results of 2016 present a deterioration 





Attempts to diminish corruption will 
however not stop lucrative illicit businesses and in fact, the traditional rule of plata o plomo 
(accepting money or being killed) is still operative at all levels of the political and entrepreneurial 
structure (Gomora et al., 2015). Alongside the anti-corruption operations, Calderón’s government 
focused also on destroying the drug chain, which was the official reason of the WOD in the first 
place. The immediate consequence of the WOD was the fact that cartels diversified the types of 
drugs produced. Currently, all the main drug cartels are poly-drug which further increases the level 
of their revenues (Medel and Thoumi, 2014:12). Moreover, the Mexican drug cartels specialised in 
producing and supplying also “heroin, methamphetamines, and marijuana” (Sanchez, 2013:474) as 
can be observed in Figure 4. Figure 4 needs further development as it represents graphically the 
drug diversification that the organised crime experienced since 2006. It is clear that one can seize 
only the same amount or less of the total production of a specific good. In fact, it can be observed 
that during the first years of the WOD, marijuana and cocaine were the principal types of drugs. 
However, since 2011 other two types, methamphetamine and heroin, gained importance with a 
relative diminution of marijuana and cocaine production. Moreover, the cartels have developed 
“potent synthetic opioid, fentanyl, which can be up to 50 times stronger than heroin” and it is easy 
to produce (Beittel, 2017:9). The attractiveness of synthetic drugs is the simplicity of producing 
them as there is no need for physical fields to cultivate the primary element. One needs just a small 
laboratory to “cook” the narcotic and therefore there is a cut in the expenses for logistics, 
transportation and bribing as the laboratories are located along the border (Medel and Thoumi, 
2014:13) which implies more economic revenues for the criminal groups. It is argued that the 
counter-narcotic efforts promoted by the WOD combined with other elements such as the 
Figure 2. Corruption Perception Index Mexico 
2006-2016 
Source: Transparency International (2016) 
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legalisation of marijuana in some U.S. states, the easiness of methamphetamine production, and the 
competition for the cocaine route are the major factors that lead to the diversification of the drug 
production (CNN, 2017; OAS, 2015; Lakhani and Tirado, 2016; Sin Embargo, 2016). Despite 
authorities’ efforts to diminish the level of drug production, by dismantling methamphetamine 
laboratories and igniting poppy fields, the quantity of drugs produced is still higher than the seized 
quantity (Beittel, 2017:9) as can be observed in Figure 3 and 4. 
 
Figure 3. Total cultivation of poppy field and police eradication in Mexico (hectares) 2005-2015 
Source: UNODC (2016). Graphic created by the author. The horizontal axis represents the 2005-
2015 timeframe, whilst the vertical axis represents the total hectares of poppy plants cultivated in 
the country (the total amount is given by the combination of the orange and blue colour). The blue 
colour represents the amount of hectares that the police managed to eradicate from the total 
cultivated fields, while the orange colour represents the amount of hectares that were not affected 
by the police’s eradication and effectively produced opiates. It can be observed that the country is 
experiencing a crescendo level of poppy cultivation, despite the massive efforts to eradicate them. 
  
 
Figure 4. Drug confiscated in Mexico 2006-2014 (kilograms) 




Transporting the illegal goods is dangerous and costly for the organised crime considering 
that agents on both sides of the border have to be corrupted and not always the operations are 
successful. For this reason, criminal groups are always inventing new and safe methods for moving 
goods along the border. One particular group, the Sinaloa cartel, is specialised in moving drugs and 
people under the U.S. border through tunnels. Tunnels are very difficult to identify because the 
entries and the exits are inside private buildings and overall 224 tunnels have been found since 2006 
(BBC, 2016). Not only the number of tunnels incremented since the beginning of the WOD, but also 
their level of sophistication. As a matter of fact, in 2016, an 800-meter tunnel was found between 
the cities of Tijuana and San Diego which had a lift, rails, electric and ventilation systems (BBC, 
2016). It could be argued that creating a tunnel is costly and maybe attacking the finances rather 
than the criminal groups per se will be more beneficial in weakening the drug chain. In fact, in 
2011, Felipe Calderón publicly announced that organised criminal groups should be deprived of 
their material and economic resources in order to be defeated and it was the first time that the 
Mexican president distanced himself from the over-militarised approach proposed in the beginning 
of his administration (The Los Angeles Times, 2011).  
 
The determination of destroying the drug market led to another consequence as it pushed 
criminal organisations to search for means of income outside the drug chain. The anti-drug 
campaigns urged cartels to find less profitable, but safer criminal activities (Chabat, 2015:107). 
More specifically, criminal groups have diversified their illicit activities in “kidnapping, 
assassination for hire, auto theft, controlling prostitution, extortion, money-laundering, software 
piracy, resource theft, and human smuggling” (Beittel, 2017:25). The diversification of criminal 
activities can be observed in Appendix B. Within the diversified illicit activities, migrants are 
considered a lucrative resource as they provide a rapid income. The criminal group Los Zetas is 
infamously known for kidnapping migrants and the family (usually relatives in the U.S.) is obliged 
to pay for their rescue (Zepeda Martinez, 2015:315). For a Central American migrant (from 
countries such as Honduras, El Salvador and Guatemala) the organised crime demands 20,000 
dollars, whilst for a Mexican person the price is 10,000 dollars (ANSA, 2017). For a kilogram of 
cocaine the profit might be between 10,000 and 20,000 dollars (Woody, 2016), but considering that 
the WOD was focused (at least initially) on destroying the cocaine trade, the dangerousness of the 
market and the fact that profits have to be shared between many logistic groups, the activity of 
kidnapping defenceless migrants is far more attractive. In fact, in 2017, Mexico experienced six 
abductions per day. The planning is simpler compared to drug trafficking because kidnapped people 
are generally kept in houses located along the smuggling route: the organisational network is 
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therefore limited to a restrained geographical area (Andrade, 2017). Any delay in the payments 
increases the probability of victims being tortured, raped and finally killed. Moreover, once the 
migrants are freed, they are obliged to smuggle drugs into the U.S. which diminishes the costs and 
risks for the criminal groups, but is hazardous for the migrants (Univision, 2012). The discovery in 
Tamaulipas, in 2010, of 72 mutilated bodies of Central American migrants shocked the public and 
ignited a debate regarding the state’s incapacity of protecting a weak category as the migrants 
(Zepeda Martinez, 2015:315). It is considered that the mass killing was a direct message for the 
historical Mexican smugglers, the so-called coyotes, in order to inform them that if they wanted to 
continue their human smuggling business they should pay a fee to Los Zetas (Zepeda Martinez, 
2015:315). The discovery also accentuated once again that the areas where the bodies were found 
are not controlled by the state. According to an Amnesty International report, in the 2006-2016 
timeframe, nationwide “29,917 people (22,414 men and 7,503 women) were reported as missing by 
the government “either kidnapped by criminal groups or forcibly removed by the militaries” (2017).  
 
Another field of diversification is stealing natural gas from natural gas fields located mostly 
in the northern parts of Mexico. Pemex (state-owned oil company) declared that narco-groups 
managed to steal around 40% of the total annual production of gas through self-constructed 
pipelines with a loss in 2016 (latest available data) of 1.6 billion dollars (Webber, 2017). The 
worrisome aspect is that the population is also involved in this activity, mostly unsuspected children 
and women who are used as spies or human shields during attacks from governmental forces 
(Webber, 2017). Poverty, inequality and economic instability are certainly some major push factors 
which invite people to join organised crime as unskilled labourers or (in some extreme cases) killers 
(Correa-Cabrera, 2014:427). Moreno (cited in Correa-Cabrera) argues that poverty and weak 
socioeconomic conditions are the reason behind the easiness of recruiting members (2014:427). The 
IEP declares that in 2016 “the estimated economic impact of organised crime was 17 billion pesos1, 
but this is probably a very conservative estimate” (MPI, 2017:73). The economy of illicit activities 
is certainly difficult to calculate due to the secrecy and illegality of the black market. The Drug 
Enforcement Administration (DEA) confirms that annually a flow of 19-29 billion dollars leave the 
U.S. to enter Mexico illegally and 41% of it is drug-trafficking revenues. Also, Mexican organised 
crime has the capacity of “washing” annually between 8 and 25 billion dollars which are introduced 
within the legal Mexican banking system (SHCP, 2012:18). Ellingwood and Wilkinson, two 
journalists from The Los Angeles Times, confirm that drug money is introduced in Mexico’s legal 
                                                 
1
 950 million dollars 
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economy and more specifically “in gleaming high-rises in beach resorts such as Cancun, in bustling 
casinos in Monterrey, in skyscrapers and restaurants in Mexico City…into the construction sector, 
the night-life industry, even political campaigns” (2011). In 2012 Mexico’s tax authorities have 
declared that the country had around 10 billion dollars which were impossible to verify legally and 
therefore were considered revenues from illegal activities, which fuels corruption within the country 
(SHCP, 2012:17). Despite the counter-narcotic and anti-corruption campaigns, the Mexican 
organised crime not only economically survived the shock but also managed to diversify its illicit 
activities which led to major profits.   
 
6.2 The War on Drugs and fragmentation 
 
The kingpin strategy-consisting of beheading the cartels-adopted during the WOD led to a 
territorial and structural fragmentation of organised crime. Fragmentation, in turn, led to an 
augmentation in the level of violence. When the WOD was declared in 2006, Mexico had four 
dominant narco-groups: the Tijuana/Arellano Felix Organization (AFO), the Sinaloa Cartel, the 
Juárez/Vicente Carillo Fuentes Organization (CFO), and the Gulf Cartel (Beittel, 2013:9). Later 
those groups became eight major organisations: Sinaloa, Gulf Cartel, Los Zetas, Los Caballeros 
Templarios, Cartel Jalisco Nueva Generacion, Juárez Cartel, Beltrán Leyva Organisation, and La 
Familia Michoacana. Maps number 1 and 2 offer a visual comparison in order to better understand 




Map 1. Cartels presence 2007 
Source: Stratfor (2008) 
 
Map 2. Cartels presence 2015 
Source: DEA (2015) 
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The new groups such as Los Zetas or La Familia were already operating within the Mexican 
territory but as a part of the four main groups. For example, Los Zetas were engaged as mercenaries 
by the Gulf cartel which wanted to spare their own members. Los Zetas had to protect “high-
ranking members, escort valuable shipments of contraband and carry out assassinations of rivals or 
government officials” (Stratfor, 2008). Mercenaries are loyal to their commanders in charge and in 
fact, when the founder of the Gulf cartel was arrested and extradited to the U.S. in 2007, Los Zetas 
separated themselves from the group and started attacking their former employer’s illicit activities 
and territories (Beittel, 2013:10). Los Zetas were hired by the Gulf cartel due to their militaristic 
capabilities. In fact the group is formed by former members of the Mexican Army which deserted 
for better gains (Chabat, 2015:104). One might think that only the leaders of such a group have 
military background, but when considering that in 2008 the Mexican Secretary of National Defence 
declared that “one out of every three drug traffickers has a military background” and that by the 
same year 20,000 people deserted from the Mexican Army, it is understandable how the entirety of 
Los Zetas has a militaristic stamp (Williams, 2009:328).  
 
The dangerousness of Los Zetas is that the group has perfect knowledge of the capabilities 
and counter-narcotic strategies of the Mexican Army. One aspect that has to be clarified is that 
before the arrival of Los Zetas, all the other criminal groups had equal powers and were not 
militarised. They were certainly violent and obsessed with profits, but the unwritten law of 
respecting the territorial presence of other groups was valid. However, when the government 
adopted a kingpin strategy which aimed at beheading the cartels, Los Zetas exploited the 
opportunity. The group disrespected the old established rules between cartels which included the 
respect for routes and the drug chain and was the first Mexican criminal group that deliberately used 
violence in order to obtain and control new territories. This behaviour is diverse from the usual 
criminal behaviour which is focused essentially on maintaining the existing illicit activities mostly 
operating anonymously (Chabat, 2015:104). Zetas’ power was driven from the fact they “had much 
more expertise in violence than either rival traffickers or the police” (Williams, 2009:328) and had 
more resources (including stolen armament) which permitted them to directly attack other cartels 
(Chabat, 2015:106). Considering that Los Zetas members were once part of the Mexican 
establishment, the group was never involved in the secretive pax mafiosa between the state and the 
criminal groups. As it was mentioned through the research, the agreement was created in order to 
maintain the level of violence at low levels. It is clear that, if Los Zetas were external to the 
agreement, the state had no leverage on the group and was unable to control its level of violence. 
Los Zetas raise to power is the most relevant example of the consequences of the territorial 
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fragmentation. Weakening the cartels permitted the existent criminal groups to search for new 
territories. This territorial fight had, of course, led to an augmentation in violence.    
 
If the territorial fragmentation might seem an obvious consequence such cannot be argued 
regarding the structural fragmentation. Historically cartels were formed by blood-tied family 
members and for a long period of time this structure represented the power of organised crime. 
However, with the new race for territory the old framework became a weakness. This is related with 
the fact that the fight between cartels entered in a new phase where the violence became personal as 
each group had to vindicate the death of a member which was also a relative. Also the state decided 
to exploit this weakness which led to an open and public war. In 2012, Los Zetas killed the son of a 
PRI leader because the nephew of one of the leaders was killed by the Mexican forces which led to 
an eye for an eye approach (Animal Politico, 2017). Subsequently, organised crime decided to 
change its structure by splitting in smaller units. The new structure is perfectly explained by Medel 
and Thoumi:  
 
“Currently, all of Mexico’s thriving drug gangs rely on business 
management tactics, necessary to overcome the pressure exerted by 
Mexican authorities. Family-style gangs’ centralised decision making 
made them vulnerable when authorities, or rival drug gang members, 
killed or captured a group’s kingpin because often no one was capable of 
stepping up and replacing him. The business management style is more 
likely to create decentralised administration and decision-making boards in 
which each member has well-determined territories and the full group 
meets only to make the biggest decisions. That style has shielded them 
from catastrophe when top leaders are killed or captured and allowed them 
to maintain consistent and stable control over large portions of territory 
suitable for production and smuggling routes” (2014:15) 
 
The new administration (in charge since 2012) continued Calderón’s strategy, but the new 
president is officially not following a kingpin approach anymore. The decision is due to the fact that 
the high level of violence within the country is considered being a consequence of the 
abovementioned strategy. In fact, a vacant spot in a cartel fuels a race for leadership power between 
the members of the same organisation or external criminal groups (Chabat, 2015:105). The National 
Development Plan approved in 2013 shifted the focus from the organised crime being a national 
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security threat towards human security (Mexico Government, 2013). Albeit being previously 
nominated, human security was never considered as a main objective to be achieved by the Mexican 
state (Luna, 2016). More specifically, the new path to be pursued is creating a new police force 
called National Gendarmerie whose members (40.000) will be deployed in rural areas in order to 
maintain the control of the inner and most inaccessible mountainous zones in the country (Medel 
and Thoumi, 2014:18). The main goal of the new administration is “to diminish the extent and 
character of the DTOs’ activity from a national-security threat to a law-and-order problem and…to 
transfer responsibility for addressing this challenge from military forces back to the police” (Beittel, 
2017:28). Moreover, the inflammatory counter-narcotic rhetoric disappeared from the political 
discourses. In fact, the expression “war on drugs” is not used anymore in public speeches (Lozano-
Vazquez, 2015:51). It could be argued that the political establishment aims at shifting the attention 
of the public opinion from the violent conflict towards other events in order to, in the end, 
desecuritise the issue.  
 
However, despite the official discourse, since the beginning of the WOD 63% of the drug 
leaders have been either captured or killed by the armed forces ( 25 people during the Calderón 
presidency and 75 during the current Peña Nieto’s office) (Garzón Vergara, 2015:119). Those 
numbers emphasize two important aspects. Firstly, the WOD strategy indeed led to a fragmentation 
of the cartels considering the number of drug-leaders eliminated during the current administration. 
And secondly, despite the official discourse, the kingpin strategy is still utilised. Furthermore, up to 
today, none of the drug leaders arrested has been “effectively prosecuted in Mexico” and are 
currently expecting their extradition to the U.S. (Beittel, 2013:3). It can be argued that such an 
approach undermines the decision-making power and sovereignty that Mexico has regarding the 
prosecution of narco-traffickers. 
 
It seems that, as for the two other types of WOD operations analysed in the previous sub-
chapter, also the kingpin strategy failed to weaken cartels. A relevant reason for the fact that 
organised crime manages to maintain its dominant position is related to the easiness of buying 
weapons and armament. The ungoverned areas with the U.S. border are perfect for the illegal 
passage of weapons (legally bought in the southern states of the U.S.), whilst the southern porous 
border permits the smuggling of weapons stolen from Central American troops (Beckhusen, 2012; 
Williams, 2009:329). Since 2006, the Mexican militaries have sized massive arsenals that represent 
the power and dangerousness of the organised crime. It is imperative to mention at least some of the 
weaponry that was confiscated since 2006: anti-tank rockets, rocket launchers, grenade launchers, 
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fragmentation grenades, AK-47 rifles and dynamite which represent both organised crime’s 
economic wealth and ability for self-defence (Beckhusen, 2012; Williams, 2009:329). The arsenals 
found represent the heavy militarisation of the narco-groups. The militarisation should not 
necessarily be seen as the incipit of an insurgency, but rather it identifies with the activity of 
“acquiring much more sophisticated military equipment and using military-style execution 
techniques” (Correa-Cabrera, 2014:430).  
 
The Northern border is of paramount importance not only for the fact that it permits 
smuggling weaponry, but also for its role in drug trafficking. The U.S.-Mexico border is generally 
depicted as extremely violent and cities such as Nuevo Laredo, Ciudad Juarez, and Tijuana are 
infamously known for the number of drug-related murders. The reason for the high level of violence 
is a combination of presence of cartels (and affiliates) and the fact that those cities are located on 
the cocaine route. Generally, cocaine shipments are cut in smaller pieces when the drug arrives at 
the Southern border; then travels north and at the Northern border is reunited in massive blocs in 
order to be transferred to the U.S. (OAS, 2015). The cities along the border have the perfect 
geographical location for the last step in the cocaine’s transfer and the presence of cocaine 
(therefore profit) attracts small and big criminal groups who want to have control over the market 
and such results in increased levels of violence. If the border region was historically controlled by 
the Sinaloa cartel, today the area is contended between several groups and such is a consequence of 
the territorial fragmentation of the organised crime. 
 
Mexico fell into another spiral of violence in 2016 with the homicide rate increasing by 18% 
(2017:2) according to the annual report for peace provided by the IEP. The new rise in violence is 
connected with the extradition to the U.S. of the head of the Sinaloa cartel and several groups are 
aiming for their territories which host the famous tunnels (Animal Politico, 2017). According to The 
Guardian, 2.186 murders were committed in the sole month of May surpassing the 2011 crime level 
(which is considered the deadliest year since the beginning of the WOD). Moreover, Mexico 
registered, in the first five months of 2017, an augmentation of 30% of drug-related crimes 
compared to the same period of 2016 (The Guardian, 2017). Some scholars, such as Beittel, 
consider that in some cities the violence has reached a war-level dimension (2017:1). In the short 
run the cartel will be probably weakened considering that is attacked both by the state and other 
groups. However, considering the peculiarities of the group, the Sinaloa cartel will be able to resist. 
The decentralised structure will protect the majority of the cells while some of them will suffer 
attacks considering that there is minimum communication between them (Beittel, 2013:10). The 
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decentralised structure is highly functioning considering that the Sinaloa cartel is the only organised 
crime group that has affiliates in all continents (except Antarctica) and covers illicit operations in 
more than 50 countries (Beittel, 2013:12).  
 
The elimination of the head of the cartels led to a territorial and structural fragmentation of 
the cartels which consequently increased the level of violence within the country. Moreover, as 
Beittel argues, the change in display of violence such as car bombs, decapitations, torture, mass 
killing go far beyond the typical violence of the drug trade and it is more and more debated if the 
Mexican organised crime “may be acting more like domestic terrorists” (2011:1).  The method of 
leaving leaderless the groups retaliated against the state as the remaining members started a race for 
power and territory. The four dominant groups are now divided in eight smaller units which 
increase the level of insecurity. After a decade of on-going conflict, the WOD strategy in Mexico 
has produced a massive increment in violence. The WOD policy covers a plethora of operations, 
from ignition of the coca plantations to intelligence training to the newest drone control and aimed 
strike (Martin and McCulloch, 2014:108). However, with the development of new technologies and 
globalisation, the aggressive counter-narcotics approach has little effect on stopping the supply of 
drugs (Martin and McCulloch, 2014:109).  
6.3 The War on Drugs, cartels and civilians 
The U.N. defines an organised criminal group as a “structured group of three or more 
persons, existing for a period of time and acting in concert with the aim of committing one or more 
serious crimes or offences …, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material 
benefit“ (2003). The definition clearly states that organised crime will act solely in order to gain 
profits which imply that criminal groups have limited interest in publicly displaying their position 
and the intrinsic violence is circumscribed to the illicit business. In fact it is common knowledge 
that violent methods are used “to discipline employees, enforce transactions, limit the entry of 
competitors, and coerce” (Beittel, 2013:7) and it is rather unusual for there to be a public display of 
violence against civilians. However, the latest violent behaviour against civilians can be hardly 
explained with the U.N.’s definition.  
 
The nexus between cartels, government and the Mexican population is not easy to decipher. 
With the new generation of organised crime, secrecy is not the main aspect of the drug chain 
anymore. In fact, the new kingpins who are younger (due to the past purges) often use public spaces 
such as social networks or media in order to menace their adversaries or to parade their wealth 
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respecting the secular tradition of machismo (Montalvo, 2016). Considering that many historical 
leaders have been eliminated during the WOD, the vacant spots are filled by inexperienced young 
people who are often reckless. When the illicit market was controlled by four main groups the 
members had to undergo an extensive preparation and the membership to a cartel was to be 
maintained secret, whilst now, with a lack of continuous leadership and fragmentation in smaller 
groups, the newest members are not heavily controlled as they were in the past (Balderas and 
Janowitz, 2016). The lust and the immediate enrichment of the younger members are seen as a rapid 
social climbing which has to be publicly displayed. From a sociological point of view, the 
abandonment of a secretive life has lured the younger generations into a narco-culture which 
glorifies death and violence and the consequences of such an unhealthy temptation might be 
disastrous (Rodriguez Navarro, 2017). Moreover, Rodriguez Navarro argues that not only boys 
aspire to be members of a cartel (which would signify respect and economic safety), but also among 
girls there is the tendency of desiring the role of a jefe’s girlfriend which will represent an economic 
stability (2017). Rodriguez Navarro argues that, considering the level of unemployment among 
youngsters and the overall poverty, these goals are worrisome but not unexpected (2017). It is 
common for local musicians (popular in rural areas) to praise a cartel or another in their songs 
which reminds the antique tradition of an ode to the hero (Shelley, 2001:222; Stratfor, 2008). 
 
It surely would be simpler if the theoretical bad vs. good concept could be applied to the 
Mexican reality, but the dimension of the problem and the multiplicity of the actors make for an 
intricate situation. However, one aspect is certain: the WOD negatively impacted the Mexican 
population. The wave of violence has indeed affected the civilian population which was spared 
before the WOD or at least that was the general perception. It seems that the public opinion 
considered violent events as less worrisome if the deaths were related to an inter-cartel fight. As a 
matter of fact, when in 2006 the Michoacan Cartel known as La Familia (the Family) presented 
itself in a night club throwing five human heads on the dance floor, the horrific event was perceived 
as an inter-cartel execution and the population did not feel directly threatened. In fact, the heads had 
a message which stated: “The Family does not kill for money. It does not kill women, it does not 
kill innocent people. Only die those who have to die. Everyone should know that, this is divine 
justice” (“La familia no mata por paga. No mata mujeres, no mata inocentes, sólo muere quien 
debe morir, sépanlo toda la gente, esto es justicia divina”) (La Jornada, 2006). The murderous 
event was just the first of the many that followed, but did not gain the same relevance as another 




In 2011, Los Zetas militarily attacked and set on fire a casino in Monterrey which left 
behind 52 casualties. This attack has awakened the national public opinion for several reasons. First 
of all, Monterrey is a rich industrial area extremely close to the U.S. border (which quite worried 
both the Mexican and U.S. establishments) that previously was sheltered from cartels’ violence 
(BBC, 2011). Secondly, the people that died during the attack were part of the middle-upper class 
which destroyed the common idea that cartels’ violence was secluded within poor rural areas and 
that the Mexico bien (wealthy Mexico) will not experience it. Thirdly, this event happened five 
years after the abovementioned event with La Familia and it represented the fact that the promises 
of a quick and resolute solution regarding the cartels were indeed just promises. And lastly, the 
attack was caused by the fact that the owner of the Casino refused to pay the protection fee to Los 
Zetas (BBC, 2012). The dominant cartel in Monterrey at the time was the Beltran Leyva 
Organisation (BLO), therefore there was no reason to pay a protection fee to another cartel. 
However, as it was mentioned before, Los Zetas had more capabilities and managed to eliminate the 
BLO cartel. Clearly the casino attack was to inform the city that there was a new cartel in charge 
(Dudley, 2012).  
 
The public opinion was determined to have justice for the Monterrey attack and it was 
difficult for the government to dismiss it as an inter-cartel showdown and in two weeks the people 
responsible for the aggression were incarcerated (Sanchez, 2013:468). For the first time, a high-
located politician, (at that time President Felipe Calderón), declared that Mexico was experiencing a 
new wave of violence perpetrated by terrorists with no limits (Sanchez, 2013:468). The terrorist 
rhetoric has since then diminished and also Calderón agreed that his response was more emotional 
than rational, but those heated comments have started a debate within the region which tries to 
understand if the conflict might have reached the dimensions of a real war (Sanchez, 2013:468). 
The attack was also publicly condemned by the Sinaloa cartel which declared that being a drug 
trafficker does not signify being a cold blooded murderer (Chabat, 2015:109). The distance taken 
emphasizes the fact that Los Zetas have the power to disrespect the unwritten rules of the organised 
crime. The Monterrey attack is the perfect example which explains how the fragmentation process 
led to a violent race for territory and the subsequent violence directly affected the population. Also, 
the population was attacked by new cartels that arrived in a specific area rather than by the 
historical cartels. Therefore, the behavioural change was due to the fact that the new incomers had 
no connection with the populace or the territory hence there was no need to create a bond with the 
local population. In fact, considering the race for territory, the situation is extremely dynamic and a 
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cartel does not control a specific territory for too long thus it has to obtain the maximum amount of 
profit in a limited period of time.  
 
Before the Monterrey episode, despite the poor results of the WOD, “citizens’ support…has 
not been eroded” as people were still expecting the changes promised by the administration (Diaz-
Cayeros et al., 2011:15). However, when the level of fear became unbearable, the same people that 
supported the institutions reached criminal groups for protection. The anomalous societal change 
was due to the fact that the state was perceived as being unable to protect the population. Since the 
beginning of the WOD the government put in place new extraordinary measures which officially 
had the aim of increasing the level of security within the country. In 2006, a new law was approved 
which permitted the police to detain a person supposedly connected to the organised crime for 80 
days without any official criminal charges (Sanchez, 2013:471). However, during the chaotic years 
of the WOD, the militaries and the police (which have the purpose to defend the citizens) abused of 
their legal power and the indiscriminate arrests diminished the overall level of trust between the 
population and legal institutions (Diaz-Cayeros et al., 2011:48). Therefore, the population (mostly 
located in rural areas, afar from central governmental institutions) preferred the protection offered 
by criminal groups rather than accepting the state’s illegal behaviour. However, as it was mentioned 
before the situation is complex as is the human behaviour involved. If some people decided to enter 
within a “security corruption” dimension where the safety is provided by the criminal groups which 
create insecurity in the first place, other people were coerced into this new dimension. In fact, some 
municipalities that were obliged to pay a fee (derecho de piso) for their security decided to resist, by 
creating self-defence groups. 
 
The Mexican National Commission for Human Rights declared that, since 2013, 46 civilian 
self-defence armed groups formed across the country (De Llano, 2013). The leaders of the groups, 
such as José Manuel Mireles are seen as local heroes, but they are considered a threat by the 
institutions (Garcia, 2017). Mireles led one of the most extensive and active groups which gathered 
25,000 people in its fight against Los Caballeros Templarios Cartel in Michoacán (the region where 
the WOD started) and the group had a strong societal impact which induced the state to incarcerate 
its leader in order to debilitate the movement (Garcia, 2017). The self-defence groups tend to 
occupy state’s buildings (such as town halls or police departments) by using hand grenades or 
armed attacks and these actions eviscerate an already weak institutional presence. However, for the 
moment, the smaller self-defence groups and the Mexican state are allies. The central power needs 
the locals because they have a greater knowledge about the territory or the social structure and those 
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aspects are paramount when external militaries are sent to an unknown region (Chouza, 2013). 
Also, organised crime requests a combination of fear and respect from the community they are 
operating in and generally it is difficult to find someone willing to testimony (Stratfor, 2008). 
However, within the self-defence groups this code of silence is absent. Rivera, a Mexican political 
analyst, considers that arming poor and angry civilians is a delicate matter. In fact, despite their 
noble intentions, their actions could lead to a civil war (self-defence groups vs. cartels) or the self-
defence groups could, in the long run, substitute themselves to the defeated cartels (cited in Chouza, 
2013). Nonetheless, it seems that the Mexican state prefers to postpone the moment when the 
security problem posed by armed civilians will be addressed. 
 
Despite being fought both by the state and by the civilians, in some areas of the country, 
cartels became a “state within the state” or as Correa-Cabrera defines the situation “some 
organisations have become non- state actors competing with the state that not only engage in harsh 
and violent control and cleansing practices, but also overtake state functions in the areas of security 
and taxation” (2014:430). The consequences of this illegal replacement are disastrous for the 
population. In fact, those municipalities that experience massive organised crime presence have a 
lower economic ability. In 2016, the economic loss due to violence has the equivalent of 17.6% of 
the country’s GDP (MPI, 2017:2). Also, the same regions are subject to a negative migration rate 
which means that people emigrate and the region is not of any interest for new incomers. Ciudad 
Juarez is utilised as the perfect case study due to the presence of multiple criminal groups (violence) 
and its closeness to the U.S. border (territorial significance) and it is argued that “the epidemic of 
violence caused a circle of migration, economic decline, urban deterioration, and worsened 
security” (Atuesta Becerra, 2015:33).  
 
The fragmentation of the organised crime and the instalment of criminal groups in new 
territories led to the forced displacement of civilians. It is considered that, since the beginning of the 
WOD, 115,000 people have been forcibly displaced due to drug-related violence (Sanchez, 
2013:483). In 2014, the number of people fleeing from violent regions was four times higher than 
that “of people leaving non-violent municipalities with similar socio-economic conditions” (Albuja, 
2014:28). An important aspect to be considered when analysing the forced migration in Mexico is 
that it is not officially or internationally acknowledged (IDMC, 2012; Global Initiative, 2014; Rios, 
2016). The reason behind this decision is the fact that, officially, in Mexico there is no on-going 
conflict because one faction in the fight (organised crime) does not have a political or religious 
driven motif. And if there is no conflict, it is extremely difficult to gain the status of a forced 
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migrant. In fact, from the 203 Mexican asylum seekers which presented a request in the U.S. (in 
2014) stating “violence” as the main reason for the demand only around 1 % has gained the status, 
and the justification for the rejections was the fact that indiscriminate violence cannot be considered 
a sufficient reason to apply for asylum if the country is not experiencing an officially recognised 
conflict (Albuja, 2014:30). The worrisome aspect is that often people are threatened by actions 
which go “from direct coercion and physical threats to the erosion of the general environment and 
quality of life”, but they do not have any legal or international protection (Albuja, 2014:30).  
 
According to the Mexican Commission on Human Rights, solely in the Sinaloa state -since 
the beginning of the WOD- 27,000 people were forced to leave due to drug related violence and it is 
considered (despite having limited or insufficient data) that the total number of forced migrants in 
Mexico is between 160,000 and 1.6 million (Global Initiative, 2014). Appendix C offers a 
minuscule overview of the situation by presenting the total number of internal displaced people in 
solely one year (2014). However, according to UNHCR which is the international body regarding 
migrants and refugees, “there are no internally displaced people or refugees in Mexico” (Global 
Initiative, 2014). Such can be due to the fact that UNHCR retrieve the data and statistics from the 
national governments and as was briefly mentioned before, the Mexican government does not 
officially recognise this issue. However, “the United Nation Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and the OAS Inter-American Commission on Human Rights” has 
invited Mexico to immediately acknowledge the alarming numbers of the displaced people and to 
activate a national defence protocol (IDMC, 2012; Rios, 2016).  
 
The WOD, if to disregard the constructivist rhetoric, was officially created to eliminate the 
threat posed by the drug-trafficking activity. The operations, in-depth presented through the chapter, 
had consequences which directly affected the Mexican population. The strong-hand approach has 
diminished the trust between the populace and the state. As a consequence, people either turned 
towards illicit actors for security or decided to create self-defence groups. The WOD is complex 
and the multiple events might create a chronological confusion. For this reason, before the 
conclusion, an exhaustive timeline aims to offer a quick sum up of the major events verified during 
the WOD. The timeline presents some of the most important drug-leaders eliminated during the 




Diagram 1. Main events occurred during the WOD. Source: Animal Politico (Narcodata), 2017 


































In current times, the security agenda in Latin America has changed radically from what it 
was a few decades ago. If during the Cold War the communist ideology was considered the main 
threat, today the region confronts a plethora of menaces with organised crime and drug-trafficking 
having a major relevance. The research accompanied the reader through a journey where the WOD 
was the principal actor. As a matter of fact, the researcher decided to experiment a new approach. 
The typical analysis of the WOD policy is considering the U.S. as the main player while the other 
(important) subjects are relegated to a background figure. In this research, it was intended to 
certainly acknowledge the importance of the U.S. in the region, but the main focus of the analysis 
was designated to be on the actors that are directly involved within the WOD: the Mexican state, 
organised crime and the Mexican populace. One of the major intentions was to provide an 
explanation about how the WOD impacted the entirety of the society and to what extent all the 
subjects are connected between them. The research aimed to avoid depicting the population as 
victims that suffer in silence and instead attempted to present the different survival methods that the 
Mexican populace decided to follow. At the same time, the research intended to demystify the 
general idea that Mexico is governed by the organised crime. Until proven otherwise, Mexico is a 
democracy and the head of the state is legally elected. Certainly, due to its administrative system the 
central government is sometimes too central, which means that corrupt officers and the organised 
crime can act without punishment in remote and inaccessible areas of the country. As was argued 
throughout the research, Mexico has ungoverned spaces where criminal groups are in control, but 
the country as a whole cannot be considered a failed state. It cannot be ignored the fact that the 
Mexican establishment and criminal groups cohabited for decades and pretending to dismantle a 
strong and corrupt network within a few years is certainly appealing, but not feasible.  
 
The research found that the WOD policy in Mexico had a constructivist meaning rather than 
being a real necessity. A weak presidency needed popular support which was obtained by 
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securitising a problem through the political and war rhetoric. As it was observed through the 
analysis drug trafficking was not considered a major problem by the majority of the Mexican 
population, contrary to more relevant issues such as corruption or poverty. Securitising the drug 
issues led to a hyper-militarisation of the counter-narcotic efforts and despite the latest attempts of 
taking the distances from the “war” rhetoric the country is still experiencing an on-going violent 
conflict. 
 
The main question of this research was if the WOD has empowered drug cartels, rather than 
weakening them. The counter-narcotic and operations led to a diversification both regarding drugs 
and illicit activities in general. Categories that once were relatively protected, as the migrants, are 
considered a new source of income for the organised crime as they pose fewer risks when compared 
with the drug trade. The WOD focused its operations on reducing drug production and eliminating 
corruption rather than blocking the economic capabilities of the organised crime which continues 
being a wealthy enterprise. The kingpin strategy lacked an institutional support. Despite arresting 
63% of the drug-leaders none of them were officially prosecuted in Mexico and are indeed waiting 
to be extradited to the U.S. for a trial. Moreover, the elimination of the leaders led to both a 
territorial and structural fragmentation of cartels which led to an augmentation in violence. The 
level of violence directly affected the population. The population was forced to internally migrate 
and those that were not able to move decided to either accept a situation of security-corruption 
where criminal groups request a fee for protection or to form armed self-defence groups. 
Considering the three situations that the population had to choose from it is clear that the level of 
security did not improve since the beginning of the WOD. It cannot be argued that the WOD 
invented violence, but it certainly raised the level and entity. Moreover it is presumed that 200,000 
people died due to WOD-related violence (Lakhani, 2016). Williams argues that the increment in 
violence is due to “factional splits and the inability of leaders to maintain control” (2009:334). 
Through the research it becomes clear that organised crime can adapt to any hostile environment, 
but in order to do so some elements should be available: economic resources, violent means, 
corruptible legal actors, demand for illegal goods and ungoverned spaces. It is clear that organised 
crime does not necessarily need violence, but it can be used as a convincing instrument.  
 
It is clear that the initial promises were politically constructed and strategically poorly 
understood and in the long term the situation violently escalated and there is little evidence that 
might suggest a weakening of the Mexican organised crime (Sanchez, 2013:473). To sum up, the 
level of violence is still high in Mexico, the country is experiencing a wave of internal displaced 
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migrants related to organised crime violence, the Mexican economy is invaded by narcos’ illicit 
revenues, the level of corruption (despite an improvement in the overall perception) is still elevated 
and the organised crime, not only fragmentised itself in smaller units (but as dangerous and cruel as 
the traditional narco-groups), but also diversified their illicit business in ways which directly 
threaten civilians (such as kidnappings) and finally, the drug production continues to be elevated. It 
is certainly difficult to offer a definitive answer for the research question, but it can be argued, when 
considering the findings, that organised crime was not weakened by the WOD approach. It seems 
rather that the criminal groups are more powerful than a decade ago as they have diversified their 
illicit revenues and territorial presence. However, probably the most worrisome aspect is the 
formation of the narco-culture where young people aim to become members of a cartel. This 
emphasizes the social impact cartels had over the population during the past decade. It is certainly 
rather soon to have a precise outcome for the WOD policy, but if agreeing with Medel and Thoumi 
“one should expect further adaptations and survival of the illegal industry” (2014:19). The 
abovementioned affirmation is not driven by a pessimistic view, but rather is a realistic explanation 
for a phenomenon that Latin America has experienced several times over the course of the past 
decades. 
 
The WOD strategy will never be the right answer considering the high demand of drugs and 
the high revenues from the illicit market. The WOD policy did not solve the organised crime 
problem and it is more arguable that the militarised approach “simply distracted from the necessary 
institutional change” (Sanchez, 2013:509). The future of the Mexican struggle against the organised 
crime is unclear and unknown. Certainly, the worst case scenario for a future Mexico and the Latin 
American region is having a weak and corrupt state which will prepare the path for a narco-state. 
The highly improbable scenario is not considered irrational by many political analysts. The hyper-
militarisation of organised crime and the insurgency of armed self-defence groups might pose a risk 
towards Mexican institutions which could find themselves in a weak position in the years to come. 
In fact, alongside the traditional calls for legitimation and decriminalisation of narcotics, some 
isolated voices ask for another pax mafiosa in order to reduce the level of violence (Beittel, 
2017:28). The analysis overall invited the reader to critically consider security menaces outside the 
traditional realist perspective and in an under-studied continent, Latin America. Finally, the 
research had the goal of analysing, from a security point of view, a region that generally is 
considered peaceful. It is certainly true that, globally, other realities are posing a major threat to the 
international security, but at the same time it cannot be disregarded that the Mexican cartels are a 







































Appendix A: The most important issue in the country. 
 
 








































Appendix C: Internal Displaced People in Mexico. 
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